Kyodo News Reports China Told U.S. It Could Cancel the Sept. 24 Trump-Xi Summit if a New Taiwan Arms Sale Is Approved
Citing unnamed sources, Japan's Kyodo News agency reported on Sept. 13, 2026 that Beijing has told Washington it would call off Xi Jinping's planned White House visit if the Trump administration signs off on new weapons sales to Taiwan.
The Meeting Both Sides Want, and the One Thing Neither Will Say Out Loud
Xi Jinping and Donald Trump are due at the White House on September 24, 2026 — a state visit, and the third time the two leaders will have met in about a year[1][8]. On September 13, Japan's Kyodo News agency reported something that could blow that up: China has reportedly told the United States it will cancel the summit if Washington approves a new round of weapons sales to Taiwan[1].
No government has confirmed this. Kyodo's report rests entirely on unnamed sources described as familiar with the relationship[1]. That single fact should sit next to everything else in this story, because it changes what the story actually is. It isn't a confirmed ultimatum. It's a claim about one, three months after both men were praising a new, calmer chapter in U.S.-China relations.
That calm was real, or at least loudly announced. Trump made a three-day state visit to Beijing in May 2026, after which Xi described a "Constructive Strategic and Stable Relationship" between the two countries[15]. At that same meeting, Xi called Taiwan "the most important issue" between Washington and Beijing, warning that mishandling it could bring "clashes and even conflicts"[2][15]. So the warning, if it happened, isn't a new position for China. It's an old position being applied, allegedly, to a summit both men have said they want.
A President Who Says the Quiet Part About Leverage
The arms package at the center of this is worth roughly $14 billion, and Trump has not signed off on it[2]. He didn't hide his thinking. In a Fox News interview taped in Beijing, he called the package "a very good negotiating chip for us frankly," and said whether he approves it "depends on China"[2]. He also said Taiwan "would be very smart to cool it a little bit."
To understand why that single line caused an uproar, it helps to know how a Taiwan arms sale actually works. Taiwan can't just buy American weapons on the open market. It requests items through a U.S. government channel called Foreign Military Sales. The executive branch decides whether to offer the sale, and only after the Pentagon formally notifies Congress can a contract move forward. Every step before that notification is entirely up to the president[2].
That's the mechanism Trump is using. Holding the $14 billion package "in abeyance" isn't illegal and it isn't a broken promise — it's a pending decision that hasn't reached the notification stage yet[2]. It's also why calling it a "chip" landed as such a big deal: a president had said out loud that a legal obligation Congress treats as settled is, in his own dealmaking, still on the table.
That line drew fire from directions that don't usually agree. The Washington Post led with the "anxieties" the remark stirred up in Taipei[3]. A bipartisan group of senators had written to Trump before his China trip insisting that U.S. support for Taiwan "is not up for negotiation"[2]. And on the China Committee in the House, Democrat Raja Krishnamoorthi warned publicly against Taiwan concessions ahead of the Xi meeting[10] — while Republican chair John Moolenaar argued, separately, that continued arms sales actually prove the U.S.-Taiwan partnership is strong[11]. Even inside one party, the arms sale reads two different ways.
Why Beijing Calls It a Red Line, and Why That Word Isn't Just Rhetoric
China's objection to arms sales isn't new or improvised. Its position is that Taiwan is Chinese territory, and that arming it is arming one part of a country against the rest — something Beijing argues no state would tolerate on its own soil. Its foreign ministry describes its opposition as "consistent, clear and firm"[6], and it points to prior U.S. commitments, including a 1982 pledge to gradually reduce arms sales, that it says Washington keeps breaking[6].
"Red line" here is doing real work, not just adding drama. When Beijing calls an issue a red line, it means it has publicly committed to respond if crossed — which means failing to respond costs it credibility elsewhere, on other disputes entirely. That's the logic behind what happened after the last package: in December 2025, after the U.S. announced an arms sale worth more than $10 billion, China's foreign ministry sanctioned 20 U.S. military-linked companies and 10 executives, warning that anyone selling arms to Taiwan "will pay the price"[5][13].
Those sanctions mostly don't bite. The targeted defense firms have little to no business in China to lose[5][13]. So the retaliation is more symbolic than economic — a public marker that Beijing did something, even if it didn't cost the U.S. companies much. Which is part of why a reported summit condition matters more than another sanctions list: a canceled meeting with the American president would be a cost Washington could actually feel, and a lever Beijing hasn't needed to pull with previous packages.
Chinese state media, notably, aren't reporting the summit threat at all. Global Times has covered China's objection to the paused sale and its "consistent, clear and firm" position[6], but not that Beijing may have attached a condition to a scheduled Xi-Trump meeting. That's a meaningful omission: acknowledging a summit ultimatum would look like coercion, not principle, and Chinese coverage has framed the pause instead as vindication of a position it has held all along.
Taiwan's Argument Has Nothing to Do With Feelings
Taiwan's president, Lai Ching-te, responded directly to Trump's "negotiating chip" comment, saying U.S. arms purchases are "the most important deterrent" against regional conflict[7]. That's not a sentimental objection. It's a mechanical one.
Deterrence only works if the other side believes the weapons will actually show up. The moment arms sales get described as a bargaining chip, Beijing learns something specific: that the flow of weapons can be slowed or stopped through pressure, whether or not any shipment is actually canceled. Taiwan argues that this belief alone weakens deterrence, even before a single missile system is delayed.
Taiwan has also put its money where that argument is. It has committed roughly $40 billion to weapons purchases and a layered air-defense system, called Taiwan Dome, covering 2026 through 2033[9][17]. Its 2026 defense budget alone is NT$949.5 billion — about $31.18 billion, or 3.3% of its GDP[9][17]. That's the largest defense budget in Taiwan's history, and much of it is earmarked for American equipment. If the $14 billion package stays "pending" indefinitely, that's not an abstract diplomatic delay — it's Taiwan sitting on orders it's already budgeted for, waiting on a decision it doesn't control[2][9].
Two Governments, Two Legal Definitions of the Same Island
Underneath all of this is a gap that never fully closes, no matter who's in the White House. Beijing operates on what it calls the "one China principle": Taiwan is part of China, and that's not up for debate. Washington operates on a "one China policy": it acknowledges Beijing's position without endorsing it, and has never said Taiwan's status is settled[2].
That gap — between acknowledging a claim and accepting it — is the legal space where U.S. arms sales to Taiwan exist at all. It's also why this argument doesn't resolve itself. China isn't misreading the situation when it calls arms sales a violation of prior commitments. The U.S. isn't misreading it either when it says arms sales are legal and ongoing. Each government is reading the same set of facts through its own framework, correctly by its own logic.
Both leaders, notably, still want the September 24 meeting to happen. An eight-month tariff truce sits behind all of this, and the summit is meant to turn that truce into something more durable[8]. Kyodo also reported that Trump has his own reason to want the meeting to go forward: a chance to show a diplomatic win before November's midterm elections[1]. Canceling the summit would cost both governments something real, which is the strongest argument that the $14 billion package stays exactly where it is — pending, not approved, not killed — at least until after September 24.
How the Story Is Being Told, Depending on Who's Telling It
The coverage of this episode splits less over the facts than over which fact gets to lead. Fox News centered its report on Trump's own "negotiating chip" language and the alarm it caused among senators, turning a story that could have been about Chinese pressure into one about how far a Republican president might shift Taiwan policy[2]. The Washington Post led with the anxieties the remark caused in Taipei, giving less room to the administration's own case that a pending package is leverage, not a giveaway[3].
Taipei Times, which carried the Kyodo report, headlined it as a threat — "China threatens US meeting over arms sales" — foregrounding coercion without carrying Beijing's own framing that the arms sales themselves violate prior U.S. commitments[1]. South China Morning Post described China as "rattled" by chaos in the Trump White House ahead of Xi's visit, a frame that consistently locates the instability on the American side[8]. And ZeroHedge repackaged the Kyodo report with a dramatic headline of its own, giving less weight to the single-source caveat than to the drama of the claim itself[12].
What none of the coverage disputes is the most important fact: this rests on unnamed sources in one wire report, more than a week before the meeting it concerns is set to happen. Whether the September 24 summit takes place as planned, gets postponed, or falls apart entirely will settle the question in a way no anonymous source can.
Summary
Japan's Kyodo News agency reported on Sept. 13, 2026 that China has told the United States it would cancel a planned Sept. 24 summit between Xi Jinping and President Trump if Washington approves new arms sales to Taiwan[1]. Kyodo attributed this to unnamed "sources familiar with bilateral relations" and said Chinese officials had already passed the message to the American side[1]. Neither government has publicly confirmed it. That single-source status is the most important caveat in the story.
The meeting would be Xi's state visit to Washington and the third in-person Trump-Xi meeting in a year[1][8]. It is timed to the U.N. General Assembly week[8]. It follows Trump's own three-day state visit to Beijing in May 2026, where the two sides announced what Xi called a "Constructive Strategic and Stable Relationship"[15]. At that meeting Xi called Taiwan "the most important issue" between the two countries and said mishandling it could bring "clashes and even conflicts"[2][15].
The weapons at issue are a roughly $14 billion package Trump has not signed[2]. In a Fox News interview taped in Beijing in May, Trump said approval "depends on China" and called the package "a very good negotiating chip for us frankly"[2]. He also said Taiwan "would be very smart to cool it a little bit." A bipartisan group of senators had written to him before the trip saying U.S. support for Taiwan "is not up for negotiation"[2]. Taiwan's president, Lai Ching-te, publicly answered that U.S. arms are "the most important deterrent" against regional conflict[7].
The genuine dispute is not whether Beijing objects to arms sales — it always has, and says so openly[6]. It is whether a U.S. president should let those sales become a bargaining item at all. Beijing and, in effect, the administration's dealmaking approach treat arms sales as one variable in a broader relationship. Taipei and much of Congress in both parties argue they are a legal obligation and a deterrent that loses its value the moment it becomes negotiable[2][7][10][11].
The Event
On Sept. 13, 2026, Japan's Kyodo News agency reported that China had warned the United States it would cancel a planned Sept. 24 summit between Xi Jinping and President Trump if Washington approved new arms sales to Taiwan, citing multiple unnamed sources[1]. Kyodo reported that Chinese officials had already conveyed that position to the U.S. side and had restated that Taiwan is a "red line" in the relationship[1]. The meeting, which would be Xi's state visit to the White House and the third Trump-Xi meeting in a year, is scheduled during U.N. General Assembly week[1][8]. As of publication, neither the White House nor China's foreign ministry has publicly confirmed or denied the reported threat.
Undisputed Facts
- Kyodo News reported the warning on Sept. 13, 2026, attributing it to unnamed sources familiar with the relationship, not to any named official or public statement[1].
- A Xi-Trump meeting is planned for Sept. 24, 2026 at the White House, during U.N. General Assembly week[1][8].
- Trump made a three-day state visit to China beginning May 13, 2026, after which Xi announced a "Constructive Strategic and Stable Relationship"[15].
- In a Fox News interview taped in Beijing, Trump said he had not approved a roughly $14 billion Taiwan arms package, that approval "depends on China," and that it was "a very good negotiating chip"[2].
- In December 2025 the State Department announced an arms package for Taiwan worth more than $10 billion — reported elsewhere as about $11 billion[16][1].
- China's foreign ministry responded to that package by sanctioning 20 U.S. military-linked companies and 10 senior executives, saying anyone selling arms to Taiwan "will pay the price"[5][13].
- Taiwan President Lai Ching-te has said U.S. arms purchases are "the most important deterrent" against regional conflict and instability[7].
- Taiwan approved a special weapons budget of about $40 billion covering 2026 through 2033, including a layered air-defense system called "Taiwan Dome," and set its 2026 defense budget at NT$949.5 billion — about $31.18 billion, or 3.3% of GDP[9][17].
The Pressure
Strip away the moralizing and blame. What structural realities persist regardless of which narrative wins?
- How a U.S. arms sale actually works
- This is the mechanism the whole dispute turns on. Taiwan does not buy weapons on an open market. Most purchases run through Foreign Military Sales: Taipei requests an item, the executive branch decides whether to offer it, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency formally notifies Congress, and only then can a contract proceed. Every step before notification sits with the president. That is why Trump can hold a $14 billion package "in abeyance" — pending, not canceled — without breaking any law[2]. It is also why Taipei and Congress see the hold as consequential: the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 obliges the U.S. to make defensive arms available, but it does not set a deadline or a list. The obligation is real; the timing is discretionary. Both sides of this argument are reading the same statute correctly and disagreeing about what discretion is for.
- "Red line" is a term of art, not a metaphor
- When Beijing calls Taiwan a red line, it means an issue on which it has publicly committed itself to respond, so that failing to respond costs it credibility elsewhere. That commitment is why China has retaliated to each recent package — sanctioning 20 U.S. defense firms and 10 executives after the December 2025 sale[5][13]. It is also the constraint on Beijing: having said it will act, it must act, even when the retaliation hurts its own interests.
- Two different "one China" formulas
- Beijing holds the "one China principle": Taiwan is part of China, full stop. Washington holds a "one China policy": it acknowledges Beijing's position without endorsing it, and has never agreed Taiwan's status is settled. The gap between acknowledge and accept is the legal space in which U.S. arms sales exist. Each side's argument here is coherent inside its own formula, which is why the dispute never resolves.
- Both leaders want the meeting
- An eight-month tariff truce is the backdrop, and the Sept. 24 visit is meant to turn it into something more durable[8]. A canceled summit costs both sides. That mutual interest is the main reason to expect the package to stay pending rather than be approved or killed before Sept. 24.
- The midterm clock
- Kyodo reported that Trump values the summit partly to show results before November's congressional elections[1]. Any timing of the arms decision will be read against that calendar, whatever the actual reasoning.
Material realityRegardless of how the summit is framed, several things stay fixed. Taiwan has already committed roughly $40 billion over 2026-2033 to weapons and a layered air-defense system, with its 2026 defense budget at NT$949.5 billion — about $31.18 billion, or 3.3% of GDP[9][17]. Much of that money buys American equipment, so a U.S. hold does not just delay a signature; it strands planned purchases. A $14 billion package that is pending still has not been notified to Congress, so nothing ships[2]. China's retaliation tools against arms sales remain largely symbolic, because sanctioned U.S. defense firms have little China business to lose[5][13]. And the underlying trade relationship — the tariff truce both sides want to extend — is worth far more to both economies than any single weapons package. Those facts hold whether or not the Sept. 24 meeting takes place.
Narrative as a weaponFour actors are shaping what this story means. Beijing wants you to see arms sales as the provocation and its own response as restrained principle — which is why Chinese state media report the objection but not the reported summit condition. Japanese reporting, which broke the story, wants you to see a U.S. president who may be tempted to trade an ally for a photo opportunity; Japan has a direct stake in a firm American line on Taiwan. The Trump administration wants you to see a negotiator holding an asset in reserve, not a concession. Taipei and a bipartisan bloc in Congress want you to see a legal obligation that loses its whole value the instant it becomes conditional. Underneath all four framings sits one unresolved fact: the core claim in this story comes from anonymous sources in a single wire report, and no government has confirmed it.
How Each Side Sees It
Each major actor’s view — how it frames things, its underlying incentive, and how it’s materially affected. Tap a side to read it.
Frames it asBeijing's case is a sovereignty case, not a security one. It holds that Taiwan is Chinese territory and that selling weapons there is arming one part of a country against the rest — something no state would accept on its own soil. Its officials say U.S. arms sales violate commitments Washington made in the three joint communiques, including the 1982 pledge to reduce arms sales over time, and that opposition is "consistent, clear and firm"[6]. Beijing also argues the U.S. wants the benefits of stable ties — a tariff truce, market access, cooperation on AI — while continuing the one action it has been told for decades is a red line. From that view, attaching a condition to a summit is not a threat but the ordinary consequence of a violation[1][5].
WhyXi wants the summit, but on terms that do not look like acquiescence. A White House state visit is a prestige win; being photographed there days after a new U.S. weapons package would be a domestic humiliation. Beijing also has a concrete opening: a U.S. president who has already said the package is negotiable[2]. Pressing now may convert a standing objection into an actual freeze.
Impact on themChina's economy still depends on the tariff truce holding[8]. A canceled summit would put that at risk. Its retaliation tools against arms sales — sanctioning U.S. defense firms and executives — have limited bite, since those firms mostly do not sell to China[5][13]. Leverage over the summit itself is the stronger instrument, which is also why using it publicly would cost Beijing the appearance of calm it has cultivated since May.
Frames it asThe administration's strongest argument is that it is not giving anything away — it is pricing something it already controls. Arms sales are discretionary; a president can time them. Trump's position is that holding the $14 billion package "in abeyance" — meaning formally pending, not canceled — buys leverage on trade, chips and other files while costing Taiwan nothing it has already received[2]. The administration also frames its Taiwan policy as demanding more, not less: its February 2026 arms-transfer executive order favors countries that spend heavily on their own defense, and Trump has pressed Taipei to raise defense spending sharply[9]. In that telling, a stable U.S.-China channel and a better-armed Taiwan are complements, not opposites.
WhyKyodo reported that Trump places high value on holding the summit, in part to show diplomatic wins before the November midterm elections[1]. He also has an eight-month tariff truce he wants to turn into something durable[8]. Both goals argue for keeping the package pending rather than approving or killing it.
Impact on themThe administration faces a squeeze from its own side. Republican China-committee chair John Moolenaar has praised arms sales as strengthening the partnership[11], and a bipartisan Senate letter told Trump Taiwan's defense is "not up for negotiation"[2]. Approving the package may cost him the summit; shelving it invites a bipartisan accusation that he traded an ally for a trade deal.
Frames it asTaipei's argument is about the mechanics of deterrence, not sentiment. Deterrence works only if the other side believes the weapons will arrive. The moment arms sales are described as a bargaining chip, their deterrent value drops even if not one item is canceled — because Beijing learns the flow can be switched off by pressure. Lai has answered Trump directly, saying U.S. arms are "the most important deterrent" of regional conflict and that arms sales are governed by U.S. law, not by discretion alone[7]. Taipei also points to what it has done itself: a roughly $40 billion special weapons budget through 2033 and a 2026 defense budget at 3.3% of GDP, rising toward a pledged 5% by 2030[9][17].
WhyTaiwan needs both the hardware and the signal. It also needs to avoid being seen at home as a bargaining item, which would strengthen domestic arguments that relying on Washington is a losing bet.
Impact on themTaiwan has already committed the money and, in some cases, placed the orders; delays leave it paying for a defense plan whose delivery schedule it does not control. Its 2026 budget of NT$949.5 billion, about $31.18 billion, is the largest in its history[9] — spending that assumes U.S. supply.
Frames it asThis bloc's case rests on the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, the U.S. law passed when Washington switched recognition to Beijing. It requires the United States to make defensive weapons available to Taiwan and to keep the capacity to resist coercion against it. Members argue this makes arms sales a standing legal commitment, not a favor the executive may trade. Democrat Raja Krishnamoorthi has warned publicly against Taiwan concessions at the summit[10]; Republican John Moolenaar has argued the sales strengthen the partnership[11]. Their shared analogy: you do not negotiate the existence of a fire department with the party threatening arson.
WhyPreserving congressional authority over a policy Congress wrote into statute, and preventing a precedent that a summit invitation can pause a legal obligation.
Impact on themCongress does not approve these sales, but it does receive formal notification before major ones and can hold hearings, attach conditions to defense bills, and slow nominations. Its practical lever is political cost, not a veto.
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The Bias Ledger average rating 4.9
The same story, as framed by outlets across the spectrum, ordered least to most biased. The bias score (1 = straight, 10 = heavily spun) is an AI assessment of that framing — click an outlet to see its track record. The tell is the word choice or omission that reveals the angle.
| Outlet | Vantage | Bias | How they frame it | The tell |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kyodo News | Japanese | 3 | China warns it would cancel the Xi-Trump summit if the U.S. approves new Taiwan arms sales, per sources. | The entire story rests on unnamed sources, and the framing adds a motive for Trump — wanting wins before the November midterms — that the sources are not shown to support. Japan has its own stake in a firm U.S. line on Taiwan, which is context a reader should hold alongside the scoop. |
| Taipei Times | Taiwanese, pro-independence-leaning | 4 | "China threatens US meeting over arms sales" — the threat is the story. | Chooses "threatens" and places the item on the Taiwan news page, foregrounding coercion. It does not carry Beijing's own framing that arms sales breach prior U.S. commitments. |
| Fox News | U.S. right | 4 | Trump holds a $14 billion Taiwan weapons package as a China "negotiating chip," and the remark "sparks alarm" over how far he would shift policy. | Unusually, the critical frame points at a Republican president. The alarm is sourced to senators rather than to the outlet, which is fair — but the piece leans on Trump's most quotable line and gives little room to the argument that timed leverage is normal statecraft. |
| The Washington Post | U.S. left-of-center | 4 | Trump's description of Taiwan as a "good negotiating chip" raises anxieties. | "Raises anxieties" makes allied worry the yardstick for the policy. The administration's own theory — that the package is pending, not canceled, and that leverage is the point — appears mainly as something to be reacted to. |
| South China Morning Post | Hong Kong-based, owned by Alibaba Group | 5 | China is "rattled" by White House chaos weeks before Xi's visit; the summit tests a fragile truce. | Positions Beijing as the steady party managing an erratic Washington. That is a defensible read of the record, but it consistently locates the source of instability on the U.S. side. |
| ZeroHedge | U.S. libertarian/anti-interventionist, aggregator | 6 | "Beijing Threatens To Cancel Trump-Xi Summit If US Approves New Arms Sales To Taiwan." | Repackages the Kyodo report without adding sourcing, while the site's house view treats U.S. commitments to Taiwan as overreach. The single-source caveat gets less weight than the dramatic frame. |
| Global Times | Chinese state-run, published under People's Daily | 8 | China's opposition to arms sales is "consistent, clear and firm," reported after a U.S. official said a sale was paused. | The omission is the story. Chinese state media report the objection and the pause as vindication, but not that Beijing conditioned a scheduled summit on U.S. behavior — which would read as coercion rather than principle. Also uses "China's Taiwan region" throughout, embedding the legal claim in the copy. |
References
- China threatens US meeting over arms sales — Kyodo News · Japanese wire service; cooperative owned by Japanese news organizations. Read via Taipei Times, a Taiwanese English-language daily with a pro-independence editorial lean.
- Trump holds $14 billion Taiwan weapons package as China 'negotiating chip' — Fox News · U.S. right-leaning; owned by Fox Corporation
- Trump's description of Taiwan as a 'good negotiating chip' with China raises anxieties — The Washington Post · U.S. left-of-center; owned by Jeff Bezos
- Trump weighs Taiwan arms package after summit aimed at steadying US-China ties — PBS NewsHour · U.S. public broadcaster; partly federally funded, center to center-left in framing
- Foreign Ministry Spokesperson's Remarks on Countermeasures Against U.S. Arms Sales to China's Taiwan Region — Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China · Chinese government primary source
- China's opposition to US arms sales to Taiwan region consistent, clear and firm, says FM — Global Times · Chinese state-run tabloid published under People's Daily, the Communist Party's official paper
- Taiwan's president defends US arms purchases that Trump called 'bargaining chip' — The Hill · U.S. political trade publication, centrist positioning; carrying Associated Press reporting
- China rattled by Trump White House chaos weeks ahead of Xi visit — South China Morning Post · Hong Kong-based English daily owned by Alibaba Group
- Taiwan announces $40 billion budget for weapons purchases as U.S. pressures island to increase defense spending — CBS News · U.S. broadcast network news; center to center-left
- Krishnamoorthi warns against Taiwan concessions as Trump prepares to meet Xi — U.S. House Select Committee on the CCP (Democratic staff) · U.S. congressional Democratic primary source
- Moolenaar: Trump Administration's Sale of Arms Strengthens US-Taiwan Partnership — U.S. House Select Committee on the CCP (Republican majority) · U.S. congressional Republican primary source
- Beijing Threatens To Cancel Trump-Xi Summit If US Approves New Arms Sales To Taiwan — ZeroHedge · U.S. libertarian, anti-interventionist financial and news aggregator
- China-Taiwan tensions: US defense firms, executives sanctioned over arms deal — The Hill · U.S. political trade publication, centrist positioning
- Top Chinese diplomat rips record US arms sale to Taiwan amid drills near island — The Hill · U.S. political trade publication, centrist positioning
- 2026 state visit by Donald Trump to China — Wikipedia · Volunteer-edited encyclopedia; used only for dates and publicly reported quotes, not for analysis
- State Department announces $10 billion-plus arms sales package to Taiwan, angering China — PBS NewsHour · U.S. public broadcaster; partly federally funded
- Taiwan unveils $40bn budget for defence spending to counter China — Al Jazeera · Qatari state-funded international broadcaster
- US government officially notifies Taiwan of latest arms sale — Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan) · Taiwanese government primary source
- Will Trump Continue to Slow Arms Sales to Taiwan? — Global Taiwan Institute · Washington think tank founded to advocate for closer U.S.-Taiwan ties; explicitly pro-Taiwan orientation