Duke Energy Settlements Would Cut NC Rate Request; Attorney General Declines to Sign, Disputes 6.8% Figure
Duke's two North Carolina utilities settled with the Public Staff in July 2026 at a 9.8% allowed profit rate, but Attorney General Jeff Jackson declined to sign either deal — rejecting the Duke Energy Carolinas settlement over its own disclosed 9.5% residential increase, and separately rejecting the Duke Energy Progress settlement because he says residential bills there would rise 9.3%, not the 6.8% Duke testified to — as Utilities Commission hearings continued through August.
The Same Deal, Two Different Answers From the Same Attorney General
Duke Energy's two North Carolina utilities both cut their rate requests by more than half this summer. Both settlements landed on the same profit rate. And North Carolina's attorney general refused to sign either one — but for two different reasons.
That split matters. Duke Energy Carolinas filed its settlement with the Public Staff, the state's consumer-advocacy arm, on July 17, 2026, in Docket E-7 Sub 1329[5][17]. Duke Energy Progress reached its own separate deal days later[4][9]. Attorney General Jeff Jackson rejected the Carolinas settlement because Duke's own filing already shows residential bills rising about 9.5% over two years — a number Duke doesn't dispute[21]. He rejected the Progress settlement for a sharper reason: he says Duke told the commission, under oath, a number that understates what residential customers will actually pay[3][2].
What a Monopoly Trades for Cash
Both settlements set an allowed return on equity, or ROE, of 9.8%[5]. That figure is the whole ballgame, and it needs unpacking, because a regulated utility can't just raise prices when it wants more money.
Duke Energy can't compete for customers the way a normal business does. It has a legal monopoly over electricity in its territory, so a state commission decides what profit rate Duke is allowed to earn on the money it spends building poles, wires and power plants[5]. That approved pot of spending is called the rate base. In the Carolinas case it's about $25.7 billion, with roughly $3.8 billion of new capital planned[5].
Here's why the number matters to both sides. Set the ROE too low, and investors put their money into a different utility that pays better — and that can hurt Duke's credit rating, which raises the interest rate Duke pays on grid debt for decades. Customers end up covering that borrowing cost through higher rates later. Set it too high, and customers pay more today for no reason but padding Duke's profit. Duke opened at 10.95%, cut its own ask to 10.48% during the case, and then settled at 9.8%[10][5]. Each side reads that same number differently — Duke calls it a real concession, and Jackson calls what remains still too much[10][2].
A Number That Means Something Different to Everyone Who Says It
The sharper fight is over Duke Energy Progress, and it comes down to one testimony. Duke Energy Progress president Kendal Bowman told the commission, under oath, that residential rates would rise 3.7% in the first year and 3.1% in the second — 6.8% total[7][3].
Jackson says that 6.8% figure is an average blended across every kind of customer Duke serves — homes, businesses, factories, everyone lumped together. His office ran its own numbers and says residential customers specifically will see 9.3%, not 6.8%[3][14]. "The details matter here, and Duke got it wrong under oath," Jackson said[3]. Duke has not conceded the 9.3% figure.
It's a case study in how one honest average can hide the number that actually applies to any given reader. A statewide average tells you what the typical bill looks like across every customer type. It tells a specific homeowner almost nothing about their own bill. Both 6.8% and 9.3% can be arithmetically true from the same filing — they're just answering different questions[3][7].
The Carolinas case doesn't have this dispute. Duke's own numbers there put the residential increase at about 9.5% over two years — 5.9% in year one, 3.6% in year two — and nobody contests that figure[21]. Jackson rejected that settlement anyway, arguing the number itself is still too high for families, regardless of whether it's accurate[21].
Four Ways to Explain the Same Bill
Step back from the disputed decimal points, and four groups are telling four different stories about why bills are rising at all — and none of them argue the spending isn't happening.
Duke's case is that North Carolina's population, factories and large computing facilities need power now, and building the grid to serve them costs money up front[10]. The Public Staff and the Environmental Defense Fund, which signed both settlements, argue a negotiated cut in hand beats a gamble in a fully litigated case — they took requests that started around 15% to 18% down to averages of 3.4% to 3.7% a year, plus refund protections if Duke's projects run late[13][4][9]. Consumer groups like AARP North Carolina and the NC League of Conservation Voters point to about $5 billion in Duke shareholder profit in 2025 and argue customers, especially those on fixed incomes, shouldn't be covering more than necessary[8]. And the John Locke Foundation, a conservative think tank whose Carolina Journal covers the case, argues the real driver is state carbon-reduction policy forcing Duke to retire coal plants early — its solution is letting large users like data centers buy power outside the monopoly system entirely[6].
That data-center question is its own live fight. A separate commission proceeding, spun out of these settlements, will decide how much of the state's grid buildout data centers pay for directly, rather than spreading those costs across ordinary households[11]. Duke has already signed a pledge aimed at shielding regular ratepayers from data-center-driven costs, though critics will be watching to see whether that proceeding delivers[12][18].
Same Facts, Different Front Page
Coverage of the settlements split largely along the fault lines you'd expect. WRAL led with what a typical household would pay each month — about $9.62 more starting January 1, 2027, then $5.89 more the following year[13][8]. Axios framed the story simply as a company lowering its own ask, without getting into the ROE mechanics[9]. Utility Dive, written for industry readers, tracked the regulatory numbers most precisely but treated affordability as an input to the case rather than the point of it.
Carolina Journal, published by the free-market John Locke Foundation, conceded the settlements cut the request but centered its headlines on the residual 9.5% figure and redirected blame toward state carbon policy[6][7]. NC Newsline, part of a progressive-aligned nonprofit network, framed the settlement as a floor to keep pushing from rather than a resolution, pairing Duke's shareholder profits against the bill increases[8]. Canary Media, funded largely by climate philanthropy, built its coverage entirely around the data-center cost-shift question, leaving the carbon-policy argument mostly unmentioned[12].
What the Commission Still Has to Decide
The North Carolina Utilities Commission opened evidentiary hearings in early August and has been taking testimony through the month, including questions to Duke about its own numbers[1][10]. It hasn't ruled on either settlement as of August 31, 2026[1][10].
A commission can approve a settlement even when an intervenor like the attorney general refuses to sign it — Jackson's objection doesn't carry a veto[2][21]. What is still unresolved is the narrowest and most checkable piece of the whole case: whether the commission's final order on the Duke Energy Progress settlement lands closer to Duke's sworn 6.8%, or the Department of Justice's 9.3%[3][7]. Separately, Duke is also seeking to recover more than $800 million in fuel costs from January and February 2026's cold snap — a different proceeding that would show up on the same bills[15].
Summary
Duke Energy runs two regulated electric utilities in North Carolina: Duke Energy Carolinas and Duke Energy Progress. Both asked state regulators for large rate increases. In July 2026, each reached a settlement with the Public Staff — the North Carolina Utilities Commission's own consumer-advocacy arm — that cut those requests by more than half[9][4]. The Duke Energy Carolinas deal, filed July 17 in Docket E-7 Sub 1329, sets an allowed return on equity of 9.8% and a retail rate base of about $25.7 billion[5][17]. The Utilities Commission held evidentiary hearings through August and has not ruled[1][10].
The fight now turns on two things: a profit rate and a percentage. The profit rate is the return on equity, or ROE. A regulated monopoly cannot set its own prices, so regulators set the percentage the company may earn on the shareholder money invested in poles, wires and power plants. Duke first asked for 10.95%, cut that to 10.48% during the case, and settled at 9.8%[10][5]. Consumer groups say every tenth of a point comes out of customer bills. Duke says a rate set too low drives away the investors who fund the grid and can hurt its credit rating, which makes borrowing more expensive — a cost customers pay later.
The percentage dispute is specific to Duke Energy Progress. Duke Energy Progress president Kendal Bowman testified under oath that residential customers would pay 3.7% more in the first rate year and 3.1% in the second, or 6.8% total[7][3]. Attorney General Jeff Jackson says that is the average across all customer classes, and that the DOJ's own math puts residential at 9.3%[3][14]. Jackson declined to sign that settlement, calling even 6.8% more than Duke needs[2]. He separately declined to sign the Duke Energy Carolinas settlement, in which Duke's own filing already puts the residential increase at about 9.5% over two years (5.9% in year one, 3.6% in year two) — a figure Duke does not dispute — saying that increase, too, was still too high for families[21]. Duke has not conceded the 9.3% Progress figure.
The sides do not agree on what the case is really about. Consumer and environmental groups say it is about who pays for grid expansion driven by data centers[12][11]. The John Locke Foundation, a conservative think tank in Raleigh, says it is about state carbon-reduction policy and the cost of replacing coal plants[6]. Duke says it is about paying for a grid that has to serve fast-growing demand. If approved, new rates would start January 1, 2027[13].
The Event
On July 17, 2026, Duke Energy Carolinas filed a Comprehensive Revenue Requirement Settlement with the Public Staff and other intervenors in North Carolina Utilities Commission Docket E-7 Sub 1329[17][5]. Days later, Duke Energy Progress announced a similar agreement with the Public Staff and other stakeholders in its own rate case[4][9]. North Carolina Attorney General Jeff Jackson declined to sign either agreement — citing the Carolinas settlement's own disclosed 9.5% residential increase, and separately disputing Duke Energy Progress's sworn 6.8% residential figure as understated[2][21]. The Utilities Commission began evidentiary hearings in early August 2026 and continued taking testimony through the month; it has not issued a decision[1][10].
Undisputed Facts
- Duke Energy Carolinas filed its comprehensive settlement with the Public Staff on July 17, 2026, in NCUC Docket E-7 Sub 1329[17][5].
- That settlement sets a return on equity of 9.8% based on a 53% equity component in the capital structure, a retail rate base of about $25.7 billion for the historic base case, and about $3.8 billion of capital in the multi-year rate plan[5].
- Duke revised its requested return on equity down from 10.95% to 10.48% during the case, before settling lower[10].
- Duke's own filing in the Carolinas settlement puts the residential rate increase at about 9.5% over two years (5.9% in year one, 3.6% in year two); this figure is not itself disputed by the Attorney General, who nonetheless declined to sign that settlement, calling it still too high[21].
- Duke Energy Progress announced its own agreement with the Public Staff and other stakeholders, which the company described as an average annual increase of 3.4% over two years[4].
- Duke Energy Progress president Kendal Bowman testified to the Utilities Commission that residential rates would rise 3.7% in the first rate year and 3.1% in the second, a total of 6.8%[7][3].
- Attorney General Jeff Jackson said 6.8% is the average across all customer classes and that the Department of Justice calculates the residential increase at 9.3% for Duke Energy Progress specifically; he declined to sign that settlement[3][2][14].
- The Duke Energy Progress settlement includes a multi-year rate plan refund rider that returns money to customers with interest if planned infrastructure upgrades are not finished on time, and an accelerated refund of $120 million a year in federal tax credits for nuclear, solar and hydro generation[4].
- A separate Utilities Commission proceeding was established to set a 'large load tariff' governing how data centers pay for grid costs[11].
- The Environmental Defense Fund signed both settlements; the Attorney General signed neither[11][2][21].
- If approved, the new rates would take effect January 1, 2027[13].
The Pressure
Strip away the moralizing and blame. What structural realities persist regardless of which narrative wins?
- Rate base is how a monopoly grows
- A regulated utility does not grow by selling more or charging what it likes. It grows by putting approved capital into the ground and earning a set return on it. That is why the Carolinas settlement's headline terms are a $25.7 billion retail rate base and about $3.8 billion of new multi-year-plan capital, not a percentage[5]. Duke's structural interest is a large approved capital program, and it will trade profit-rate points to get one.
- The Public Staff is a repeat player
- The Public Staff argues before the same commission year after year. Its incentive is a defensible record over time, not maximum confrontation in one docket. Settling a request down by more than half is a win it can carry into the next case; losing a fully litigated case is not[9][4].
- An elected advocate needs a visible fight
- The Attorney General is both North Carolina's statutory consumer advocate and an elected politician. Signing a settlement produces no headline; refusing to sign, and catching an error in sworn testimony, produces two[2][3]. That does not make his 9.3% figure wrong — the DOJ published its own calculation — but it explains the volume.
- Percentages hide who is being averaged
- Utility rate cases set different prices for residential, commercial and industrial classes. A single 'average' number can be true and still not describe anyone's bill. That is exactly the gap between Duke's 6.8% all-class average and the DOJ's 9.3% residential figure[3][7]. Both can be arithmetically defensible from the same filing.
- Demand growth is the physical driver
- North Carolina's electric load is rising from population growth, manufacturing and large computing facilities, while older coal generation is retiring. Somebody funds the replacement and expansion. The dispute is over allocation, not over whether the spending happens[12][6].
Material realityTwo settlements sit before the North Carolina Utilities Commission, one for Duke Energy Carolinas filed July 17, 2026 in Docket E-7 Sub 1329 and one for Duke Energy Progress announced days later[17][4]. Both set an allowed return on equity of 9.8% on a 53% equity layer, down from Duke's original 10.95% ask and its revised 10.48%[5][10]. The Carolinas retail rate base is about $25.7 billion with roughly $3.8 billion of new multi-year-plan capital[5]. Duke says the Progress deal averages 3.4% a year over two years and the Carolinas deal 3.7%[4][13]. As reported by WRAL, a typical residential customer using 1,000 kilowatt-hours a month would pay about $9.62 more per month starting January 1, 2027, then about $5.89 more per month in 2028[13][8]. Whether the residential total is 6.8% or 9.3% is genuinely contested, with sworn testimony on one side and the Department of Justice's own calculation on the other[7][3]. Separately, Duke has asked to recover more than $800 million in fuel and purchased-power costs from the January-February 2026 cold snap — a different proceeding that would also show up on bills[15]. And a separate large-load tariff docket, created out of these settlements, will decide how much of future grid buildout data centers fund directly[11]. The commission had not ruled as of August 31, 2026[1][10].
Narrative as a weaponFour groups are actively shaping how this reads. Duke wants you to see a company that cut its own request twice and added refund protections, so the remaining increase looks like the honest cost of a grid under strain. The Attorney General wants you to see a utility that gave regulators a flattering average and got caught, so that every Duke number looks like it needs checking. Environmental and clean-energy groups want you to see data centers as the reason your bill is rising, which moves the fight to the cost-allocation docket where they think they can win. The John Locke Foundation wants you to see state carbon mandates as the reason, which moves the fight to the legislature. Notice that three of those four are arguing about the cause of the spending, not its size — and none of them dispute that the spending is happening. The one thing to watch is the narrowest and most checkable: whether the residential number in the commission's final order reads closer to 6.8% or 9.3%.
How Each Side Sees It
Each major actor’s view — how it frames things, its underlying incentive, and how it’s materially affected. Tap a side to read it.
Frames it asDuke argues it is building a grid for demand that is arriving now, not later. Manufacturing, population growth and large computing facilities all need power, and the poles, wires and generation to serve them cost money up front. The company says it already cut its own ask twice — from a 10.95% return on equity to 10.48%, then to 9.8% in settlement — as a good-faith response to affordability concerns[10][5]. On the profit rate, Duke's strongest argument is the one that needs the mechanism explained: a monopoly cannot raise prices to attract capital, so the regulator-set ROE is the only signal investors have. Set it below what comparable utilities earn and money goes elsewhere, credit ratings weaken, and the interest Duke pays on grid debt rises. Customers pay that interest through rates for decades. Duke also points to what it gave up in the deal: a refund rider that pays customers back with interest if promised upgrades run late, and $120 million a year in federal clean-generation tax credits returned to customers faster than required[4].
WhyDuke needs a large, predictable, approved capital program. Its earnings grow mainly by investing in rate base — the pot of approved assets it earns a return on — which the Carolinas settlement puts at about $25.7 billion for the historic base case[5]. A settlement supported by the Public Staff is far more likely to be approved than a fully litigated case, and it removes regulatory uncertainty investors dislike[5].
Impact on themA 9.8% ROE is below the 10.48% Duke asked for and well below its original 10.95%, so the settlement costs shareholders real revenue[10][5]. But approval locks in a multi-year rate plan with roughly $3.8 billion of capital and rates starting January 1, 2027[5][13]. Duke also carries reputational exposure from the Attorney General's accusation that its president gave the commission a wrong residential figure under oath[3].
Frames it asThe Public Staff is the Utilities Commission's independent consumer-advocacy arm, created by statute to represent the using and consuming public. Its case is that a negotiated cut in hand beats a litigated gamble. It took roughly 15% to 18% asks down to average annual increases of 3.7% for Duke Energy Carolinas and 3.4% for Duke Energy Progress, plus refund protections[13][4][9]. EDF, which signed both deals, makes a second argument: the settlements opened a separate 'large load tariff' proceeding that will decide how data centers pay for the grid upgrades they trigger. EDF calls that the structural fix, and says winning it matters more than shaving another point off this case[11].
WhyThe Public Staff's institutional job is to produce the lowest defensible rate outcome without losing at the commission or on appeal. Settling preserves credibility for the next docket. EDF wants a durable cost-allocation rule for data centers more than it wants a symbolic 'no' vote here[11].
Impact on themIf the commission approves, the Public Staff can point to a request cut by more than half. If the Attorney General's 9.3% residential figure for Duke Energy Progress holds up, the Public Staff will face questions about whether it understood what it signed[3].
Frames it asJackson's argument is not that a cut happened — he concedes it did, in both cases[2][21]. It is that the remaining increase is still more than Duke needs to cover its investments, and that families cannot absorb it. In the Duke Energy Carolinas case, that argument stands on Duke's own numbers: the settlement's own disclosed terms put the residential increase at about 9.5% over two years, a figure Duke does not contest, and Jackson called it still too high[21]. In the separate Duke Energy Progress case, Jackson makes a sharper, second claim about honesty in the record: he says Duke's sworn 6.8% is the blended average across all customer classes, and residential customers actually face 9.3%[3][14]. 'The details matter here, and Duke got it wrong under oath,' Jackson said[3]. AARP North Carolina's Maggie Rowe makes the fixed-income case: seniors on set monthly checks cannot cut a power bill the way they can cut other spending[8]. The NC League of Conservation Voters' Dan Crawford points to about $5 billion in Duke shareholder profit in 2025 and asks why customers should backstop more[8].
WhyThe Attorney General is North Carolina's statutory utility consumer advocate and an elected Democrat; refusing to sign preserves both his legal position and a visible affordability record. Advocacy groups need a live fight to keep members engaged and to shape the coming data-center tariff case[19][8].
Impact on themJackson's refusal keeps the record open and gives the commission a reason to probe both settlements rather than rubber-stamp them — commissioners questioned Duke's numbers during hearings[10]. It does not by itself block approval; the commission can adopt a settlement over an intervenor's objection.
Frames it asLocke's argument is that both sides are fighting over the wrong number. CEO Donald Bryson says the state's own energy policy is a primary driver of the increase — the mandated retirement and replacement of coal plants and compliance with carbon-reduction targets cost billions, and those costs land in rate base regardless of how the profit rate is set[6]. Jon Sanders, who runs Locke's Center for Food, Power, and Life, goes further: let large users like data centers procure their own electricity outside the monopoly, so households are not underwriting an expansion they did not ask for[6]. Carolina Journal also keeps Duke's separate request to recover more than $800 million in fuel and purchased-power costs from the January-February 2026 cold snap in view, arguing the headline rate case understates the total hit[15].
WhyLocke opposes the regulated-monopoly model itself and uses this case to argue for competitive procurement and against state carbon mandates. It has no stake in defending Duke's profit rate[6].
Impact on themThis camp shapes how Republican legislators and right-leaning readers understand the case: as a policy-cost story, not a corporate-greed story. It also supplies the highest published residential figure for Duke Energy Carolinas — 9.5% — as a counterweight to the company's averages[6].
Frames it asLarge computing facilities argue they pay for what they use and then some — they sign long contracts, take power around the clock, and bring tax base and jobs. Their position is that a plant running steadily all year is cheaper to serve per unit than a household that spikes on a hot August afternoon. Duke has proposed special rules for these customers and signed a pledge to shield ordinary ratepayers from data-center-driven costs[12][18]. Duke's own filings and reporting on them indicate data centers are a small share of use today but a very large share of projected demand growth in North Carolina[12].
WhyData-center developers need firm, fast, affordable power and predictable rules. A hostile large-load tariff can push projects to Georgia, Virginia or Texas. They want the cost-allocation rule written in the separate proceeding, not improvised inside a general rate case[11].
Impact on themWhatever the commission decides here, the separate large-load tariff docket will determine how much of the coming buildout these customers fund directly. That proceeding, not this settlement, is where their money is at stake[11].
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The Bias Ledger average rating 3.7
The same story, as framed by outlets across the spectrum, ordered least to most biased. The bias score (1 = straight, 10 = heavily spun) is an AI assessment of that framing — click an outlet to see its track record. The tell is the word choice or omission that reveals the angle.
| Outlet | Vantage | Bias | How they frame it | The tell |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Axios | U.S. center to center-left | 2 | "Duke Energy reaches settlement to lower its proposed rate increase" — the reduction is the news. | Cleanest framing of the four, but the brevity format drops the ROE and rate-base terms entirely. Without those, readers cannot judge whether the settlement is a real concession or a negotiating posture. |
| Utility Dive | U.S. energy-industry trade press, subscription and advertiser funded | 2 | "Duke reduces rate hike request, still faces regulator pushback" — leads with commissioners questioning Duke's numbers in hearing. | Most precise on the regulatory mechanics — ROE moves from 10.95% to 10.48% to settlement — but written for utility professionals. Household affordability appears as an input to a proceeding, not as a stake. |
| WRAL | U.S. center, Raleigh local TV | 3 | "Duke Energy rate hike hearings resume in NC. How much could your power bill increase?" — service-journalism framing built around the monthly dollar impact. | Leads with the consumer question rather than the docket, and uses 'rate hike' rather than the neutral 'rate case.' Translates percentages into $9.62 and $5.89 a month, which is genuinely useful but centers the household frame over the capital-cost frame. |
| Carolina Journal | U.S. right (published by the John Locke Foundation) | 5 | "Duke settlement lowers rate hike, NC households still face 9.5% increase" and "AG: Duke residential rate increase is 9.3%, not 6.8%." | Concedes the cut in the first clause, then anchors on the residual household figure. It amplifies a Democratic attorney general against Duke — but pivots blame to state carbon policy and coal-plant replacement, a cause its own parent think tank campaigns on. Locke's role as publisher is not always disclosed in the story text. |
| NC Newsline | U.S. left (States Newsroom network, nonprofit, largely progressive-funded) | 5 | "NC environmentalists continue pushing back on Duke Energy rate hike" and "NC AG Jackson: Duke Energy gave wrong information about rate hike under oath." | Frames the settlement as a starting point for continued opposition rather than an outcome. Quotes shareholder profit (about $5 billion in 2025) next to bill increases, a juxtaposition that implies the two are directly tradeable without explaining rate base or ROE. Duke's capital-cost argument appears mainly as a company claim. |
| Canary Media | U.S. clean-energy advocacy journalism, funded largely by climate philanthropy | 5 | "Data centers are key to fight over Duke electric rates in North Carolina" — the case is a cost-shift story. | Chooses the data-center frame as the organizing question, which is one side's crux, not a neutral one. The competing framing — that carbon policy and coal replacement drive the same capital costs — is largely absent. Discloses less about its own philanthropic funding than about Duke's finances. |
References
- Duke Energy rate hike hearings resume in NC. How much could your power bill increase? — WRAL · Raleigh commercial TV station, mainstream U.S. local news
- Attorney General Jeff Jackson Won't Sign Second Duke Energy Settlement That Will Cost Families 6.8% in Rate Hikes — North Carolina Department of Justice · Official statement from an elected Democratic attorney general acting as statutory consumer advocate
- Duke Energy Gave Incorrect Residential Rate Increase; Families to Pay 9.3% More, Not 6.8% — North Carolina Department of Justice · Official statement from an elected Democratic attorney general; party to the proceeding
- Duke Energy Progress reaches agreement with North Carolina Public Staff and other stakeholders to deliver a lower-cost path to power North Carolina's future — PR Newswire · Paid press-release wire; text written by Duke Energy, a party to the case
- Duke Energy Corp Form 8-K exhibit, comprehensive revenue requirement settlement (2026) — U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (EDGAR) · Mandatory investor disclosure filed by Duke Energy; primary document, company-authored
- Duke settlement lowers rate hike, NC households still face 9.5% increase — Carolina Journal · U.S. right; published by the John Locke Foundation, a free-market think tank in Raleigh
- AG: Duke residential rate increase is 9.3%, not 6.8% — Carolina Journal · U.S. right; John Locke Foundation publication
- NC environmentalists continue pushing back on Duke Energy rate hike — NC Newsline · U.S. left; States Newsroom nonprofit network, progressive-aligned donor funding
- Duke Energy reaches settlement to lower its proposed rate increase — Axios · U.S. center to center-left; commercial digital news
- Duke reduces rate hike request, still faces regulator pushback — Utility Dive · U.S. energy-industry trade publication; advertiser- and subscription-funded, industry readership
- The Duke Energy settlement is just the beginning for North Carolina's data center energy policy — Environmental Defense Fund · U.S. environmental advocacy organization; a signatory to both settlements, so an interested party
- Data centers are key to fight over Duke electric rates in North Carolina — Canary Media · U.S. clean-energy advocacy journalism, funded largely by climate philanthropy
- Duke Energy Carolinas reaches agreement, proposed 3.7% increase — WRAL · Raleigh commercial TV station, mainstream U.S. local news
- NC attorney general challenges Duke Energy rate hike figure: 'Details matter' — ABC11 · U.S. center; ABC-owned Raleigh-Durham station
- Duke Energy seeks rate hike after early 2026 cold snap — Carolina Journal · U.S. right; John Locke Foundation publication
- 2025 Duke Energy Carolinas and Duke Energy Progress Rate Request — Duke Energy · Company-run customer information page; party to the proceeding
- Duke Energy Carolinas filing letter, Docket No. E-7, Sub 1329 — North Carolina Utilities Commission (docket system) · Primary regulatory record; filing authored by Duke Energy counsel
- Duke Energy signs pledge to shield ratepayers from data center costs — Carolina Journal · U.S. right; John Locke Foundation publication
- Rally in Charlotte Against Duke Rate Hikes to Focus on Affordability Crisis — Sierra Club · U.S. environmental advocacy organization; intervenor-aligned opponent of the increase
- Duke Energy wants an 18% rate hike for NC customers. Here's what it means for you. — NCLocal · North Carolina nonprofit local-news collaborative
- No Deal: Attorney General Jackson Won't Sign Duke Energy Settlement That Raises Families' Bills About 9.5% — North Carolina Department of Justice · Official statement from an elected Democratic attorney general acting as statutory consumer advocate