NC Utilities Commission Holds Sept. 9 Hearing on Duke Energy's 850-Megawatt Simple-Cycle Gas Plant in Rowan County
Duke Energy Carolinas is asking state regulators to certify two gas-fired combustion turbines at its Buck site, with data-center growth at the center of the fight over whether the plant is needed and who should pay for it.
Two Turbines, One Question: Who Is This Plant For?
Duke Energy Carolinas owns 850 megawatts worth of land it already knows how to use. On Sept. 9, 2026, state regulators sat down to decide whether the company gets to build on it[1].
The request is specific: two natural gas combustion turbines at the Buck site near Salisbury, in Rowan County, where Duke's old coal units used to run[2][3]. The turbines are hydrogen-capable, meaning they could someday burn a cleaner fuel blend, and Duke wants them online by 2030[2]. The case sits before the North Carolina Utilities Commission under docket E-7, Sub 1330[1].
That much nobody disputes. What's contested is almost everything else: whether the power is really needed, who it's really for, and who ends up paying for it.
A Jet Engine, Not a Furnace
Here's the detail that most coverage of this fight skips past, and it matters more than it sounds like it should: this is a simple-cycle plant, not a combined-cycle one.
A simple-cycle turbine works something like a jet engine bolted to a generator. It can start up in minutes. But it throws away its waste heat instead of reusing it, so it burns more fuel for each unit of power it makes. A combined-cycle plant captures that waste heat to squeeze out more electricity, and it's built to run most of the time. The existing 718-megawatt plant next door at Buck, which opened in 2011, is that kind[3][20].
Simple-cycle turbines like the ones Duke wants to add are built to sit mostly idle. They're meant to fire up only during the hours when the grid is most likely to fail — a bitter cold morning, a scorching afternoon. Across its whole Carolinas system, Duke has proposed roughly 9.7 gigawatts of new gas capacity by 2033: five combined-cycle plants meant to run often, and seven combustion turbines like Rowan's, meant to run rarely[5][6].
That distinction is why the fight over "need" cuts two ways. Judged purely by how much electricity it produces per dollar spent, a peaker looks wasteful. Judged as insurance against a winter freeze that knocks out the grid, it looks cheap[14][22].
Why the Company Gets Paid Either Way
To understand why this case matters beyond Rowan County, you need to understand the deal a regulated utility makes with the state.
Duke Energy Carolinas is a monopoly. Customers in its territory can't shop around for a different power company, so state law requires it to get a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, or CPCN, before it builds a major plant. That's the commission's formal finding that customers actually need what's being built[1].
If the commission grants the certificate, the plant's cost eventually gets folded into what's called the rate base — the pile of company assets that customers pay off through their monthly bills, plus a profit rate the commission sets on top. That profit rate is not a giveaway. It's how a regulated monopoly attracts the investors who fund the grid in the first place; set it too low and borrowing costs can rise, which eventually lands on customers too. But it also means Duke earns money by building things, which gives the company a financial interest that points toward "yes" every time a certificate case comes up[12][5]. The commission's job is to be the check on that.
There's a second constraint working against Duke, and it's the one the company leans on hardest. A regulated utility has to serve anyone who asks. Duke can't turn away a data center because it's inconvenient or because critics don't like it. That legal duty to serve is why the argument has shifted, in a separate but related case, toward what rate very large customers should pay rather than whether they get served at all — a special tariff Duke and the state's ratepayer advocate have agreed to file by the end of September 2026[12][21].
The Number Both Sides Quote, and Why They Read It Differently
Duke's own numbers contain the tension at the heart of this case. Data centers make up about 30% of the company's economic-development project pipeline in the Carolinas. But those same data centers account for roughly 80% of the new electricity demand Duke expects through 2030[10][18].
Duke reads that as evidence the demand is real and arriving fast, backed by signed contracts and interconnection requests, not guesswork[5][12]. The company says peaking turbines are the cheapest insurance it can buy against blackouts, and that Buck is the obvious site because the transmission lines, gas supply and land are sitting there already, left over from the retired coal units[2][3].
Environmental and consumer groups, including the Southern Environmental Law Center, the Environmental Defense Fund, Sierra Club and the NC Sustainable Energy Association, read the same 30%-versus-80% gap as proof of a mismatch. A relatively small number of enormous customers, they argue, are reshaping a power system that millions of ordinary households will spend decades paying off[9][10]. If Duke's demand forecast turns out wrong, the plant still gets paid for out of customer bills — the risk falls on ratepayers, not shareholders. These groups argue batteries, demand response and solar could cover the same peak hours faster and without a 30-year fuel commitment[9][22].
What the Legislature Already Decided
Some of what's being argued in front of the commission was actually settled somewhere else first: the North Carolina General Assembly.
In July 2025, lawmakers passed Senate Bill 266 over Gov. Josh Stein's veto. It stripped out a rule requiring Duke to cut carbon emissions 70% by 2030, while keeping a separate target of net-zero emissions by 2050[7][8]. Supporters, including Carolina Journal and the John Locke Foundation, call it the Power Bill Reduction Act and say it simply restored North Carolina's older standard: pick the lowest-cost reliable power, without a mandate pushing the math toward one technology over another. They point out that once the 2030 target came out, Duke's own planning models produced more gas and nuclear power, and kept some coal plants running longer[6][7].
Critics of the repeal see it differently. They note a Duke University Nicholas Institute study — independent academic research, not Duke Energy's own modeling — found that abandoning the tighter carbon path could add $23 billion to North Carolina power bills over time[15]. Where supporters trace rising bills back to the old climate mandate, critics trace them forward to the gas and grid spending now underway as a result of the mandate's repeal[6][14]. Duke's carbon-reduction plan going forward has to operate within whatever the legislature has set, which is why so much of this fight over gas plants is really a fight over a bill lawmakers already passed.
Buck, Again
In March 2026, before the formal hearing, Rowan County held a public-witness session, and residents showed up to object[4]. Their argument wasn't really about not-in-my-backyard. Buck has hosted heavy industrial power generation for a century, including coal ash left behind after the old units shut down[20]. Some residents argue the county keeps absorbing new industrial development to serve customers, like large data centers, that employ relatively few people locally[4][18]. Other local officials welcome the tax base and construction jobs the project would bring.
Coverage of that hearing varied by outlet in ways that tracked each newsroom's usual lens. WFAE, Charlotte's NPR affiliate, led its story with the angriest quote in the room under the headline "Nobody wants it here" — a framing that foregrounds public anger but leaves out residents who might favor the tax revenue. Carolina Journal, published by the free-market John Locke Foundation, described the broader buildout as the natural result of a mandate's repeal, without much space for what the new gas fleet itself will cost. WRAL framed its coverage around the question "who pays," a framing that assumes a cost shift is happening, though its reporting did lay out Duke's numbers and its critics' numbers side by side, and it was the outlet that separately reported the $23 billion university study. Canary Media, a clean-energy trade publication funded by climate philanthropy, covered the tariff mechanics closely but treated gas as the option needing justification and clean alternatives as the default. India's Down To Earth folded the story into a US-China competition narrative, using a tracker of announced gas projects that counts plants which may never actually get built[16].
The commission hadn't issued a ruling as of publication. Whatever it decides on the two turbines at Buck is likely to shape the outcome of the other gas plants still waiting in Duke's development plan, in Person, Catawba and Richmond counties[5][6].
Summary
The North Carolina Utilities Commission held an expert-witness hearing on Sept. 9, 2026, on Duke Energy Carolinas' request to build an 850-megawatt gas-fired plant in Rowan County[1]. The project is two hydrogen-capable simple-cycle combustion turbines. They would sit on the land where the old Buck coal units stood, next to a 718-megawatt gas plant that opened in 2011[2][3]. Duke wants the units running by 2030[2]. The case is docketed as E-7, Sub 1330[1].
Duke cannot just build it. Under state law, a regulated monopoly must first get a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity — a CPCN. That is a finding by the commission that customers actually need the plant. If the commission grants it, the construction cost eventually goes into what regulators call the rate base: the pile of company assets customers pay off through their monthly bills, plus a profit rate the commission sets. So the certificate decision is the moment the public is effectively signed up for the cost.
One detail shapes the whole dispute and is easy to miss. This is a simple-cycle plant, not a combined-cycle one. A simple-cycle turbine works like a jet engine bolted to a generator. It can start in minutes, but it throws away its waste heat, so it burns more fuel per unit of power. Plants like this are built to run a small number of hours a year, on the coldest mornings and hottest afternoons. A combined-cycle plant captures that waste heat to make more power, and is meant to run most of the time. Duke has proposed both kinds across its system — about 9.7 gigawatts of new gas by 2033, in five combined-cycle units and seven combustion turbines[5][6].
The genuine dispute is not mainly about emissions. It is about who the plant is for and who pays. Duke and its allies say new demand is real and arriving fast, and that peaking capacity is insurance against blackouts[5]. Environmental groups and consumer advocates say data centers drive roughly 80% of Duke's projected new demand through 2030 while making up only about 30% of its project pipeline[10][18], and that existing households should not carry plants built for a few very large buyers[9][10]. That fight is running in parallel in a separate proceeding over a special rate for very large customers[12][21].
The Event
The North Carolina Utilities Commission convened an expert-witness hearing at 10 a.m. on Sept. 9, 2026, on Duke Energy Carolinas' application for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity to build an 850-megawatt natural gas-fueled simple-cycle combustion turbine facility in Rowan County[1]. The project consists of two hydrogen-capable turbines on Duke-owned land at the Buck site near Salisbury, where the company's coal units formerly operated, adjacent to an existing 718-megawatt combined-cycle gas plant that began operating in 2011[2][3][20]. Duke has said the turbines are projected to enter service by 2030, subject to approval[2]. A public-witness hearing in Rowan County earlier in 2026 drew residents who spoke against data-center-driven growth[4]. The commission had not issued a final order as of publication.
Undisputed Facts
- Duke Energy Carolinas has applied to the North Carolina Utilities Commission for a certificate to build an 850 MW simple-cycle natural gas combustion turbine facility in Rowan County, docketed as E-7, Sub 1330[1].
- The proposed units would be built on company-owned land at the Buck site where Duke's coal units once stood, next to a 718 MW combined-cycle gas plant that came online in 2011[3][20].
- Duke has said the two turbines are hydrogen-capable and targeted for service by 2030, pending regulatory approval[2].
- Duke's 2025 Carolinas Resource Plan proposes new natural gas units in Person, Catawba, Rowan and Richmond counties[5][6].
- Across its Carolinas system, Duke has proposed roughly 9.7 gigawatts of new natural gas capacity by 2033, using five combined-cycle units and seven combustion turbines[5][6].
- North Carolina's Senate Bill 266 became law in July 2025 over Gov. Josh Stein's veto; it removed the state's 70%-by-2030 interim carbon-reduction target for Duke while keeping the 2050 net-zero requirement[7][8].
- Duke Energy has said data centers make up about 30% of its economic-development project pipeline in the Carolinas but account for roughly 80% of projected new demand through 2030[10][18].
- A public-witness hearing held in Rowan County in March 2026 drew residents who objected to data-center development in the county[4].
The Pressure
Strip away the moralizing and blame. What structural realities persist regardless of which narrative wins?
- Regulated utilities grow by building
- Duke earns a commission-set return on the capital it invests and places in rate base. That is not a scandal; it is how monopoly regulation is designed to attract investors who fund the grid. But it means the company's financial interest points toward building, and the commission's job is to be the check on that[12][5].
- The duty to serve is not optional
- A regulated utility must serve any customer in its territory who requests service. Duke cannot turn away a gigawatt-scale data center on policy grounds. That is why the fight has migrated from whether to serve these customers to what rate they pay — the large-load tariff Duke and the Public Staff agreed to file by the end of September 2026[12][21].
- Peakers are insurance, and insurance looks wasteful until it isn't
- A simple-cycle turbine is expected to run a small share of the year. Judged by output per dollar, it looks like a bad asset. Judged as protection against a multi-day winter freeze, it looks cheap. The two sides are often applying different tests to the same machine[14][22].
- The legislature already moved the target
- Senate Bill 266 removed the 70%-by-2030 interim carbon goal in July 2025 while keeping 2050 net zero[7][8]. Duke's planning model is built to obey state law. Much of what environmental groups now contest in the dockets was decided in the General Assembly, not at the commission.
Material realityThe electricity is going to be needed or it is not, and nobody in the case knows for certain. Duke reports roughly 6 gigawatts of data-center demand in its Carolinas development pipeline and expects data centers to be about 10% of its electricity sales by 2030, up from under 1% of peak demand today[12]. Some of that pipeline will never be built — speculative projects shop the same load to multiple utilities. If Duke builds for demand that does not arrive, the plant still gets paid for. If Duke does not build and the demand does arrive, the shortfall shows up as blackouts or as expensive emergency power. Meanwhile the physical facts at Buck are fixed: Duke owns the land, the transmission lines and gas supply are already there, and the coal units are gone[2][3][20]. Nationally, gas-fired capacity under development jumped about 50% in the first half of 2026, to 378 gigawatts on Global Energy Monitor's tracker[16] — a count of announced and pre-construction projects, many of which will not be built. Residential electricity rates rose 7.3% nationally between April 2025 and April 2026[16]. Whatever the commission decides in Rowan, that upward pressure on bills comes from the whole capital program, not one 850-megawatt plant.
Narrative as a weaponThree groups are actively shaping how this reads. Duke wants you to see an unavoidable demand curve and a prudent, cheap insurance policy on land it already owns — the framing makes the certificate a formality. Environmental and consumer advocates want you to see a cost transfer: plants built for AI companies, paid for by households, locked in for decades before the large-load rate rules exist. They front resident anger because the technical record is harder to dramatize. The free-market right wants you to see vindication of Senate Bill 266, and to trace any bill increase to the climate target the legislature repealed rather than to the gas and grid spending now underway. Note what almost nobody emphasizes: this is a simple-cycle peaker, not a baseload plant. That detail cuts against both the alarm and the urgency, which may be why it keeps dropping out of the coverage.
How Each Side Sees It
Each major actor’s view — how it frames things, its underlying incentive, and how it’s materially affected. Tap a side to read it.
Frames it asDuke's case is that demand is no longer a forecast — it is signed contracts and interconnection requests arriving faster than plants can be built[5][12]. A regulated utility has a legal duty to serve everyone who asks, and it cannot decline a customer because that customer is large. Peaking turbines are the cheapest form of insurance against the hours when the system is short: they start in minutes and cover cold winter mornings when solar output is near zero and batteries may already be drained. Duke also argues the Buck site is the low-cost choice, because the transmission lines, gas supply and land are already there from the retired coal units[2][3]. On carbon, the company points to the units being hydrogen-capable; a Duke University Nicholas Institute study, reported by WRAL, separately found an abrupt path change could add $23 billion to state power bills, a finding environmental groups cite against the gas buildout[15].
WhyDuke earns a regulator-approved return on capital it invests and puts into rate base, so approved construction is how the company grows earnings; it has also told investors that data-center load is a major driver of its capital plan[12][5].
Impact on themApproval lets Duke begin spending on an asset with a multi-decade life and recover it from customers. Denial or delay would push the company back toward alternatives it has argued are more expensive or slower, and would complicate commitments already made to large customers[5][12].
Frames it asTheir strongest argument is not primarily about emissions — it is about risk allocation. A gas plant is a bet on a demand forecast, and if the forecast is wrong, customers, not Duke's shareholders, eat the cost of an underused plant[9][10]. They point to the mismatch in Duke's own numbers: data centers are about 30% of projects but about 80% of projected new load[10][18], so a small number of buyers are reshaping a system that millions of households pay for. They argue batteries, demand response and solar can cover peaks faster and without a 30-year fuel commitment, and that Duke's plans lean on gas partly because the 2025 repeal of the interim carbon target removed the modeling constraint that had favored other resources[8][9][22]. They also note Duke's contracts increasingly require large customers to cut use on request, which they say reduces the need for new peakers[12].
WhyThese groups seek to limit new fossil infrastructure and to shift cost risk onto the large customers driving the demand; several also want the commission to treat the large-load rate question as a precondition, not an afterthought[10][21]. SELC and EDF are advocacy litigators funded by environmental philanthropy, not neutral analysts.
Impact on themA Rowan approval would set a template for the other gas units in Duke's plan, weakening their position in the remaining dockets. A rejection or conditional approval would strengthen their leverage in the parallel large-load and carbon-plan proceedings[9][21].
Frames it asTheir case is that the state spent years forcing an artificial deadline into resource planning, and that the deadline — not gas — is what raised bills[6][14]. Senate Bill 266, which they call the Power Bill Reduction Act, restored what they describe as North Carolina's long-standing legal standard: the lowest feasible cost without sacrificing reliability[6]. On evidence, they point to Duke's revised plan itself — once the 70%-by-2030 target came out, the least-cost model produced more gas and nuclear and kept some coal longer[6][7]. They also point to real-world stress: an early-2026 cold snap in the Carolinas that strained the system and preceded a Duke rate request[14]. To this camp, a peaker that sits idle most of the year is exactly the point — it is the thing that keeps the lights on in an emergency.
WhyTo validate the 2025 legislative change, keep resource planning driven by cost-and-reliability tests rather than emissions targets, and keep North Carolina attractive to power-hungry industry[6][14].
Impact on themA commission approval that cites reliability and least-cost reasoning would ratify their reading of SB 266. A denial would revive the argument that the commission still applies climate preferences the legislature removed[6][8].
Frames it asResidents who spoke at the March 2026 hearing argued they get the turbines, the pipelines and the truck traffic while the electricity and the profits go elsewhere[4]. Their strongest version is a fairness claim, not a NIMBY one: Buck has hosted heavy industrial generation for a century, including coal ash left behind after the coal units closed[20], and they say the county is being asked to absorb yet another round of industrial siting for demand created by facilities that employ relatively few local people[4][18]. Some local officials take the opposite view and welcome the tax base and construction jobs.
WhyResidents want limits on land use, air quality impacts and local burden; county officials weigh property-tax revenue from both the plant and any data centers against constituent opposition[4].
Impact on themThe county would gain tax base and short-term construction employment, and would live with the emissions, noise and land use for decades[3][4].
Frames it asThe commission's stated job is narrow: decide whether the public convenience and necessity require this plant, on the evidence in the record. The Public Staff is a separate state agency that represents the using and consuming public in these cases — it is a statutory ratepayer advocate, not a Duke ally and not an environmental group. Its typical argument is that need must be documented before customers are committed, and that costs caused by very large customers should be recovered from those customers. Duke and the Public Staff agreed to file a special tariff covering large data centers by the end of September 2026[12][21].
WhyThe commission must keep service reliable and rates just and reasonable at once, and is exposed to blame both for blackouts and for bill increases[1][11].
Impact on themIts order on Rowan will be read as a signal for the remaining gas certificates in Duke's plan, including units proposed in Person, Catawba and Richmond counties[5][6].
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The Bias Ledger average rating 4.7
The same story, as framed by outlets across the spectrum, ordered least to most biased. The bias score (1 = straight, 10 = heavily spun) is an AI assessment of that framing — click an outlet to see its track record. The tell is the word choice or omission that reveals the angle.
| Outlet | Vantage | Bias | How they frame it | The tell |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| S&P Global | U.S. financial/commodity data provider; audience is energy market participants | 2 | "Data centers' AI boom spurs new natural gas power plans in the US Southeast" | Neutral-sounding but written for investors: capacity, pipelines and project timelines are the story. Ratepayer impact and local opposition appear as risk factors to a build-out, not as contested questions. |
| WRAL | U.S. center (Raleigh commercial broadcaster) | 3 | "As data centers drive a power boom, North Carolina faces a costly question: Who pays?" | Poses the cost-shift as the organizing question, which presumes a shift is occurring — but the reporting itself carries Duke's numbers and its opponents' numbers side by side, and separately reported Duke's own $23 billion modeling figure. |
| Canary Media | U.S. left-of-center; clean-energy trade nonprofit funded by climate philanthropy | 4 | "Data centers are key to fight over Duke electric rates in North Carolina" | Strong on the tariff mechanics and Duke's own filings, but the framing consistently treats gas as the option to be justified and clean alternatives as the default. Its funding base is not disclosed in the story. |
| WFAE | U.S. center-left (Charlotte NPR member station) | 5 | "'Nobody wants it here': Rowan County residents rail against data centers at Duke Energy hearing" | Leads with the angriest quote in the room and the word "rail." Public comment is a self-selected sample; residents who support the tax base are largely absent from the frame. |
| Down To Earth | Indian; published by the Centre for Science and Environment, a New Delhi environmental research nonprofit | 5 | "US Gas Power for AI Data Centres Nearly Doubles in 2026, Pushing America Ahead of China" | Frames a U.S. permitting story as a US-China AI race, and uses Global Energy Monitor's capacity tracker — which counts announced and pre-construction projects that may never be built — as if it were a build figure. |
| Carolina Journal | U.S. right (published by the John Locke Foundation, a conservative NC think tank) | 6 | "Duke ramps up nuclear, natural gas, extends coal, omits wind in latest energy plan" — presented as the natural result of removing a costly mandate. | Uses the legislature's own bill nickname, the Power Bill Reduction Act, and quotes a John Locke analyst without labeling him as a colleague at the outlet's parent organization. Bill increases are traced to prior climate policy; the cost of the new gas fleet gets little space. |
| Southern Environmental Law Center | U.S. environmental litigation nonprofit; a party in these dockets, not a news outlet | 8 | "Duke Energy's approach to data centers unnecessarily risks increasing bills and pollution" | An advocacy release written as analysis. "Unnecessarily" does the work of an argument it does not make, and the piece is issued by an organization litigating against Duke in the same proceedings. |