Sudan's Army Secures Kordofan Export Road as RSF-Led Forces Take Geisan and Kurmuk; IOM Counts More Than 200,000 Newly Displaced in Kordofan
The Sudanese army holds a rebuilt supply corridor to El Obeid while RSF and SPLM-N forces seize two Blue Nile border towns, as the U.N. migration agency reports mass new displacement and U.S. truce talks stall over troop withdrawals.
The Road Went One Way. The Border Went the Other.
In the last week of July 2026, Sudan's army launched an offensive across three small towns in North Kordofan most people have never heard of: Bara, Jabra El Sheikh and Um Sayala[19][8]. By July 27, the army said it controlled something bigger than any of them — the paved highway linking Khartoum's Omdurman area to El Obeid, the regional capital[9]. Call it the Export Road. It's the only fast route for fuel, food and ammunition to reach a city sheltering more than 100,000 displaced people[8][12].
Two weeks later, more than 500 miles away, the war ran the other direction. On August 11, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and an allied group called SPLM-N attacked Geisan, a district capital near the Ethiopian border, and took most of the town[4][5]. Two days after that, the RSF said it had retaken Kurmuk, another border town, as the army pulled back[10][11]. Sudan's civil war, which started in April 2023, isn't being won by anyone right now[3][8][4].
Both of those things are true at once, and they don't cancel out. They sit side by side while the number underneath them keeps climbing: more than 200,000 people newly displaced across the Kordofan region since late 2025, according to the U.N.'s migration agency[1][2]. That's the story neither side disputes, and it's the one this article keeps coming back to.
Why a Dirt-Poor Highway Is Worth Fighting Over
Kordofan is flat, dry, and has almost no paved roads. That's not a throwaway detail — it's the whole military logic of the July offensive. When a region has only one or two real supply routes, whoever controls them controls whether a city eats[8][9].
That's why the army spent an offensive retaking three towns nobody outside Sudan could place on a map. Bara and the others aren't valuable for themselves. They're valuable because they sit along the Export Road, and the Export Road is how convoys reach El Obeid[9]. Cut that road, and a city of hundreds of thousands — including more than 100,000 people already displaced by earlier fighting — loses its supply line[12][1].
The same logic runs in reverse along Sudan's border with Ethiopia. Geisan and Kurmuk sit roughly 95 to 115 miles from Ad Damazin, the capital of Blue Nile state[11]. For the RSF and SPLM-N, holding towns that close to a border means having a safe rear area — a place to rest, resupply, and launch the next attack without the Sudanese army pressing in from every direction. Kurmuk in particular has become a revolving door: the RSF seized it in March, the army recaptured it in July, and the RSF took it back on August 13[10][11].
Meanwhile, the rainy season is doing its own damage. Floods cut roads, spread disease through crowded camps, and destroy shelters at the same time fighting is pushing more people into them[1][2]. Every displacement number reported in August carries some of that weather baked in, on top of the war itself.
The Number Nobody Is Fighting Over
Here's what separates this story from most of the coverage around it: the displacement figures aren't contested by anyone. The International Organization for Migration, the U.N.'s migration agency, runs something called the Displacement Tracking Matrix — teams that survey shelters, host families, and arrival points to estimate how many people have moved and from where. It functions like a running census in a war zone, which is about as close to neutral ground as this conflict has[1][2].
On August 19, that system produced a stark tally. More than 200,000 people have been newly displaced across Kordofan since late 2025[1][2]. In Sheikan locality, which includes El Obeid, displacement rose 25% over just eight months[1]. Roughly 11,000 people fled two villages, Um Samima and Abu Haraz, in a single three-day stretch, August 16 to 18[1]. Nationwide, Sudan now has about 8.6 million people displaced inside its own borders[1].
The war is also reaching the infrastructure that keeps people alive day to day. Drone strikes have hit El Obeid's main electrical transformer and a water station[1][12]. That single strike on a transformer is why water stopped pumping — it's a chain a reader can actually follow, not an abstraction. No power, no pumps, no clean water for a city already packed with displaced families in the rain.
Washington's Peace Plan Has a Catch Both Sides Can Point To
The United States isn't fighting in Sudan, but it is trying to broker an end to the war. A plan first presented in June by senior White House adviser Massad Boulos calls for a 90-day humanitarian truce, followed by a full ceasefire and political talks[15][21]. The idea, according to the administration, is that there's no military solution here — someone has to stop shooting first[21].
The catch is what the truce is tied to. The U.S. plan links the humanitarian pause to phased troop withdrawals, meaning each side would have to pull back from ground it currently holds. In July, the RSF said yes to an unconditional three-month truce but refused the withdrawal piece[15]. That distinction matters more than it sounds. Without withdrawals, a truce just gives both sides a breather to resupply and dig back in — which is exactly why the army treats a truce-without-withdrawal as no deal at all.
From the RSF's side, the logic runs the other way. Its territory on the ground is its only leverage in any political settlement. Pulling back before a deal is signed would mean giving up that leverage for a promise, while the army — which already controls the recognized state institutions — keeps everything it has[15]. Sudan's government and U.S. diplomats have already argued publicly at the United Nations over who actually rejected the truce[16].
Congress, meanwhile, is fighting its own version of this fight. A House bill, H.R. 1939, would require sanctions on foreign states found to be enabling atrocities in Sudan and would block major U.S. defense sales to any country identified as arming either side[17]. A competing Senate approach would leave those sanctions to the president's discretion, on the theory that flexibility preserves U.S. leverage with partners in the Gulf[17]. Neither bill has become law.
Who's Actually Arming the Drones
The drones striking El Obeid's power grid aren't made in Sudan. Neither side manufactures them. That single fact is why the argument over foreign sponsors isn't a side issue — it's an argument about who's fueling the war itself[1][17].
Sudan's army says RSF and SPLM-N forces attacked Kurmuk and Geisan from staging areas inside Ethiopian territory, across the border in the Benishangul-Gumuz region[11]. Right-leaning U.S. analysts, including the American Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats Project, have backed that reading with satellite and battlefield detail, describing the attack on Kurmuk as coming from two axes consistent with a cross-border staging area[11]. A Yale School of Public Health lab went further, reporting that satellite imagery of an Ethiopian army base at Asosa showed activity "consistent with military assistance to the RSF" between late December 2025 and late March 2026[18][24].
Ethiopia denies all of it — denies hosting RSF camps, denies that drones launched from its soil[18]. And there's a real gap in the evidence here worth naming honestly: a satellite image showing activity consistent with military assistance is an inference about what a base was doing, not proof that Addis Ababa ordered it. Border regions like Benishangul-Gumuz are also known for weak central government control, which cuts against reading any activity there as official state policy.
The United Arab Emirates faces a parallel accusation from members of Congress, who say it has armed the RSF — a charge the UAE has consistently denied[17][23]. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, for their part, cast their involvement as mediation; Saudi-influenced revisions reportedly helped shape the U.S. truce text before it reached Khartoum[13]. Their shared argument is that outside pressure should push both sides toward talks, not single out one sponsor over another.
What the Map Doesn't Show
Step back from the two fronts and a pattern shows up in the coverage itself. Egyptian and Gulf outlets, whose governments largely back Sudan's army, lead with the July recapture of the Export Road and call the RSF a "militia" — word choices that treat the army as the legitimate state[19]. Qatari-backed Al Jazeera and U.S. outlets like NPR lead instead with El Obeid's civilians, drone strikes, and U.N. warnings that the siege could repeat el-Fasher, where U.N. experts say the RSF killed about 6,000 civilians[3][12][22]. Independent Sudanese outlets in exile, like Sudan Tribune and Dabanga, mostly just report both sides' claims plainly, attributing them to whoever made them[8][5][20].
None of those framings is inventing facts. But all of them are choosing what to put in the foreground, and what they leave out is telling. Almost none of this coverage includes independent reporting from inside RSF-held Geisan or Kurmuk. And almost none of it examines what the army itself did in the towns it just retook.
That gap matters because the war keeps moving in both directions at once, and the people caught between the two fronts don't get to wait for a narrative to settle. About 78,000 people have fled their homes in Blue Nile state on top of the Kordofan numbers[7]. Whoever holds the Export Road next month, the families sheltering in El Obeid right now are still there, in the rain, waiting to see if the trucks get through.
Summary
Sudan's civil war moved in two directions at once this summer. In North Kordofan, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) pushed the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) back in a fast offensive that began July 25, 2026. The army took Bara, Jabra El Sheikh and Um Sayala, and says it now controls the Export Road — the paved supply route that links Omdurman, near Khartoum, to El Obeid, the North Kordofan capital[19][8][9]. In Blue Nile state, the direction reversed. On August 11 the RSF and its ally SPLM-N attacked Geisan, a district capital near the Ethiopian border, and took much of the town[4][5]. On August 13 they retook Kurmuk, a border town the army had recaptured in July[11][10].
The civilian cost is the part almost no one disputes. The International Organization for Migration (IOM), the U.N. migration agency, said on August 19 that more than 200,000 people have been newly displaced across the wider Kordofan region since late 2025[1][2]. Around 78,000 more have fled their homes in Blue Nile state[7]. Sudan now has about 8.6 million people displaced inside its own borders[1]. Drone strikes have hit El Obeid's main electrical transformer and a water station, cutting power and pumping for a city already sheltering more than 100,000 displaced people[1][12].
The United States is involved, but not in combat. A U.S. proposal first presented in June by senior adviser Massad Boulos calls for a 90-day humanitarian truce, then a full ceasefire and political talks[15][21]. In July the RSF said yes to a three-month truce but refused the phased military withdrawals the plan ties to it[15]. Sudan's government and U.S. diplomats have publicly clashed at the U.N. over who rejected what[16].
The sharpest live dispute is about outside sponsors. Sudan's army says the RSF launched attacks from inside Ethiopian territory. Ethiopia denies hosting RSF camps[18]. A Yale School of Public Health lab says satellite imagery of an Ethiopian army base at Asosa showed activity 'consistent with military assistance to the RSF' between late December 2025 and late March 2026[18][24]. Separately, U.S. lawmakers are fighting over whether to penalize the United Arab Emirates, which many members of Congress accuse of arming the RSF and which denies it[17][23].
The Event
On July 25, 2026, the Sudanese Armed Forces launched an offensive in North Kordofan and captured the towns of Bara, Jabra El Sheikh and Um Sayala, taking control of the Export Road supply corridor to El Obeid[19][8]. On August 11, the Rapid Support Forces and allied SPLM-N fighters attacked Geisan in Blue Nile state and seized large parts of the town, though the army held its main base there[4][5]. On August 13, the RSF said it had retaken the border town of Kurmuk as the army withdrew[10][11]. On August 19, the International Organization for Migration reported more than 200,000 people newly displaced across Kordofan since late 2025[1][2].
Undisputed Facts
- The war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces began in April 2023[3].
- Sudan's army announced on July 27, 2026 that it controlled the highway linking Khartoum to El Obeid[9].
- The RSF announced it captured Kurmuk on August 13, 2026, and Sudan's army confirmed an RSF advance on the town[10].
- Clashes in Geisan killed more than 20 civilians and displaced about 2,500 people[6].
- IOM reported on August 19, 2026 that displacement in Sheikan locality, which includes El Obeid, rose 25 percent over the previous eight months[1][2].
- IOM estimates about 11,000 people fled Um Samima and Abu Haraz villages in Sheikan locality between August 16 and 18, 2026[1].
- Sudan has roughly 8.6 million people internally displaced nationwide[1].
- The RSF said in July 2026 it accepted an unconditional three-month humanitarian truce but did not accept the phased withdrawals in the U.S. plan[15].
The Pressure
Strip away the moralizing and blame. What structural realities persist regardless of which narrative wins?
- Roads decide who eats
- Kordofan is flat, dry and thinly roaded. Control of a few paved corridors, above all the Export Road from the Omdurman area to El Obeid, decides whether fuel, food and ammunition reach a city of hundreds of thousands. That is why the army spent a July offensive on three small towns most readers have never heard of[8][9].
- Borders as rear bases
- Geisan and Kurmuk sit on the Ethiopian frontier, roughly 115 and 95 miles from the Blue Nile capital Ad Damazin[11]. A force with a safe rear area across a border can rest, resupply and re-attack. That is the strategic value of Blue Nile, separate from its small population.
- Rain compounds war
- Sudan's rainy season runs through this stretch of the year. Floods cut roads, spread disease in camps and destroy shelters at the same moment fighting pushes people into them[1][2]. Displacement numbers in August are always partly weather.
- Foreign money buys the drones
- Neither side manufactures the long-range drones now striking El Obeid's transformer and water station. Both depend on outside suppliers, which is why the fight in Washington over mandatory versus discretionary sanctions on sponsor states is a fight about the war's fuel supply[1][17].
Material realityTwo fronts moved in opposite directions in the same month, which means neither side is winning the war. The army holds the Kordofan supply road and Bara; the RSF and SPLM-N hold Geisan and Kurmuk on the Ethiopian border[8][4][10]. Kurmuk has changed hands repeatedly this year — the RSF seized it in March, the army recaptured it in July, and the RSF retook it on August 13[10][11]. Underneath the map, the numbers do not move back: about 8.6 million people are displaced inside Sudan, more than 200,000 of them newly displaced in Kordofan since late 2025, and about 78,000 more in Blue Nile[1][7]. El Obeid is encircled, its power and water infrastructure has been struck, and more than 100,000 displaced people are sheltering inside it[1][12]. Whichever narrative wins, those people are in camps in the rain, and the Export Road is the only fast way to reach them.
Narrative as a weaponFour actors are shaping how this reads. Sudan's army and its regional backers, especially Egypt, push the frame of a legitimate state clearing a foreign-armed militia off a national highway — hence "recaptures" and "militia" in Cairo's state press. The RSF pushes the frame of a coalition that already said yes to a truce, so that any collapse in talks lands on the army; its acceptance of a pause without withdrawal is real and also costs it nothing militarily. U.N. agencies and aid groups push the numbers, because access and funding follow scale — their figures are the most checkable material here, but scale framing also crowds out questions about who did what. And in Washington, both the administration and rival groups in Congress are shaping the story around foreign sponsors, especially the UAE and Ethiopia, because that is the lever the U.S. actually holds. Notice what is thin in almost all of it: independent reporting from inside RSF-held Geisan and Kurmuk, and any accounting of army conduct in the towns it retook.
How Each Side Sees It
Each major actor’s view — how it frames things, its underlying incentive, and how it’s materially affected. Tap a side to read it.
Frames it asThe army argues it is the internationally recognized state fighting an armed rebellion backed by foreign money and foreign weapons. Its strongest concrete point is the Export Road. That road is not a symbol — it is the paved artery that lets trucks carry fuel, food and ammunition from the Omdurman area to El Obeid[8][9]. When the RSF cuts it, El Obeid's roughly 100,000 displaced residents in camps depend on convoys that cannot get through[12]. The army says retaking it in July is what keeps that city supplied. Its second argument is sovereignty: it says RSF and SPLM-N units attacked Kurmuk and Geisan from bases across the Ethiopian border, which would make this an external attack, not a civil dispute[11][18]. Its third is that a truce which freezes lines rewards a force holding territory it took by arms[15].
WhyHold the state apparatus, keep international recognition, and avoid any deal that treats the RSF as an equal party or forces the army out of ground it just won[15][16].
Impact on themThe July gains reopened its main supply corridor to Kordofan[8]. But it lost Kurmuk in August after recapturing it in July, and it is absorbing heavy drone attacks on El Obeid's power and water infrastructure[1][11].
Frames it asThe RSF casts itself as fighting a military establishment tied to Sudan's old Islamist ruling order, and says it is building a broader coalition rather than a family militia. Its allies matter to that claim: SPLM-N under Abdelaziz al-Hilu is a long-standing rebel movement from the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile with its own decades-old grievances against Khartoum, not an RSF creation[4][11]. Its second argument is on the truce: it publicly said yes to an unconditional three-month humanitarian pause under U.N. supervision, and says the army is the side blocking a deal[15]. Its third is that pulling its forces back before any political settlement, as the U.S. text requires, would strip its only leverage while leaving the army in charge of the state[15].
WhyConvert battlefield position into a seat at a political table, and keep a parallel administration and territory in the west and south rather than surrender to a restored central government[13][15].
Impact on themIt gained Geisan and Kurmuk in August, opening ground near the Ethiopian border[4][10]. It lost Bara and the Export Road in July and has been pushed west toward Umm Bader, Sawdiri and Hamrat al-Sheikh[8]. It also faces the reputational weight of el-Fasher, where U.N. experts say about 6,000 civilians were killed[12].
Frames it asAid agencies argue the fighting and the rainy season are compounding each other, and that access, not blame, is the immediate problem. Their strongest evidence is their own counting. IOM runs the Displacement Tracking Matrix — a field system that surveys shelters, host communities and arrival points to estimate how many people moved and from where. It is the closest thing to a census in a war zone, and it put new Kordofan displacement above 200,000 since late 2025[1][2]. They also point to infrastructure: drone strikes on El Obeid's main electrical transformer knocked out power, which stopped water pumping and disabled health facilities and phone service[1]. That is the chain a reader can see — a strike on a transformer becomes no clean water in a camp.
WhySecure safe passage for convoys and funding, and keep both armed parties from treating aid routes as military targets[1][2].
Impact on themAbout 15,000 families arrived in El Obeid in three weeks, overwhelming shelters[3]. Aid delivery is further squeezed by disruption to Red Sea and Strait of Hormuz shipping routes that supply the response[1].
Frames it asThe Trump administration's position, stated by senior adviser Massad Boulos, is that there is no military solution in Sudan and that a 90-day humanitarian truce must come first, tied to phased withdrawals, then a ceasefire and political dialogue[21][15]. The logic of tying truce to withdrawal is the crux: without pullbacks, a pause simply lets each side resupply and dig in, so the truce becomes a rest period rather than a step toward peace. Critics of that approach say the withdrawal condition is exactly why no one signs. In Congress, one camp wants mandatory sanctions on foreign states arming either side — the House bill, H.R. 1939, requires sanctions on those who enabled atrocities and bars major defense equipment sales to countries identified as supporting the RSF or SAF[17]. The competing Senate approach leaves those sanctions to presidential discretion, on the argument that flexibility preserves leverage with partners such as the UAE.
WhyStop a mass-atrocity event without troops, while protecting large defense and investment relationships with Gulf partners[17][23].
Impact on themU.S. diplomats and Sudan's government have clashed publicly at the U.N. over who rejected the truce[16]. Neither the House nor Senate bill has become law, and both contain national-interest waivers that could blunt any sanctions[17].
Frames it asEthiopia denies hosting RSF camps and denies that drones were launched from its territory, and says it will not be blamed for a Sudanese war[18]. Its strongest point is procedural: a satellite-imagery finding of activity 'consistent with military assistance' is an inference, not proof of state policy, and border regions like Benishangul-Gumuz have weak central control. The UAE has consistently denied arming the RSF. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf actors argue their role is mediation — Saudi-influenced revisions shaped the U.S. truce text before it reached Khartoum[13]. Their shared framing is that outside pressure should push both sides to talk, not single out one sponsor.
WhyProtect influence over Red Sea trade, Sudanese gold and farmland, and avoid U.S. arms restrictions[17][23].
Impact on themEthiopia faces accusations from Sudan's army and a Yale lab report on the Asosa base[18][24]. The UAE faces a House bill that would bar U.S. major defense equipment sales to countries found to support either force[17].
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The Bias Ledger average rating 3.6
The same story, as framed by outlets across the spectrum, ordered least to most biased. The bias score (1 = straight, 10 = heavily spun) is an AI assessment of that framing — click an outlet to see its track record. The tell is the word choice or omission that reveals the angle.
| Outlet | Vantage | Bias | How they frame it | The tell |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sudan Tribune | Sudanese independent, Paris-based, diaspora-founded | 2 | Runs both fronts separately and plainly: "Sudanese army secures North Kordofan export road from RSF" and "RSF, allies seize parts of Geisan in Sudan's Blue Nile state"[8][5]. | Closest to straight wire style of the sources here, and it attributes claims to whichever side made them. It leans on Sudanese military and local-committee sources, which are not neutral, and it rarely flags that dependence. |
| Dabanga Radio TV | Sudanese exile media, funded largely by Dutch and European donors | 2 | "IOM: 200k+ displaced across Kordofan as fighting intensifies" — agency data relayed with minimal added framing[20]. | Attributes the number to IOM in the headline itself, which is good practice. Its long-standing focus on Darfur and civilian victims means army-side abuses and RSF-side abuses are both covered, but state-sponsor politics is largely absent. |
| Mada Masr | Egyptian independent, frequently at odds with the Egyptian government | 3 | A roundup framing: "In cross-border offensive, RSF seizes Blue Nile's Geisan, recaptures Kurmuk" alongside army wins and a defection from the RSF-led government[13]. | The "cross-border" label is asserted in the headline rather than attributed. The bundled-briefing format packs wins and losses for both sides together, which reduces spin but also flattens the scale difference between a town changing hands and 200,000 people fleeing. |
| Al Jazeera | Qatari state-funded | 4 | "Over 200,000 people newly displaced in Sudan's Kordofan as fighting rages" — leads with civilian displacement, and elsewhere asks whether El Obeid could be "Sudan's next el-Fasher"[3][22]. | Heavy, accurate sourcing to U.N. figures, but the framing consistently points toward RSF atrocity risk and away from army conduct. Qatar has backed the Sudanese government side against the UAE-aligned RSF, which the coverage does not disclose. |
| NPR | U.S. center-left, public radio | 4 | "Besieged Sudanese city faces relentless drone strikes and risk of mass atrocities, U.N. warns" — an atrocity-prevention frame anchored on El Obeid[12]. | "Relentless" is the reporter's word, not a source's. The story is built almost entirely on U.N. expert warnings, so the RSF's siege dominates and the army's own drone and air campaign gets little space. |
| Critical Threats Project | U.S. right — project of the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative think tank | 4 | "RSF Counters Recent SAF Gains in Sudan" — a military-balance frame, with the cross-border staging from Ethiopia as the lead finding[11]. | Precise on axes of advance and distances, thin on civilian impact. Uses "almost certainly" for the Ethiopia staging claim — an analytic confidence term, not a sourced fact — and the piece's institutional interest is in showing state sponsorship of proxies. |
| Ahram Online | Egyptian state-owned | 6 | "Sudanese army recaptures Bara city, other strategic areas in North Kordofan" — the army's July gains as the story, with the RSF called a militia[19]. | Word choice does the work: "recaptures" and "militia" cast the SAF as the rightful state. Egypt backs Sudan's army, and the Blue Nile losses that same month get far less prominence. |
References
- Sudan: 200,000 Newly Displaced as Fighting and Floods Intensify, Closure of Red Sea and Strait of Hormuz Threatens Critical Aid — International Organization for Migration · U.N. intergovernmental agency; funded by member states, operationally dependent on access from both warring parties
- Sudan war: 200,000 newly displaced as fighting and floods intensify — UN News · United Nations in-house news service
- Over 200,000 people newly displaced in Sudan's Kordofan as fighting rages — Al Jazeera · Qatari state-funded; Qatar has aligned with Sudan's army against the UAE-backed RSF
- RSF and SPLM-N launch attack on Sudan's Geisan town — Sudan Tribune · Sudanese independent outlet founded by diaspora journalists, based in Paris
- RSF, allies seize parts of Geisan in Sudan's Blue Nile state — Sudan Tribune · Sudanese independent, Paris-based
- Over 20 killed in Blue Nile clashes as fresh violence triggers mass displacement across Sudan — Sudan Tribune · Sudanese independent, Paris-based
- Fighting displaces thousands in Sudan's North Kordofan, Blue Nile — Sudan Tribune · Sudanese independent, Paris-based
- Sudanese army secures North Kordofan export road from RSF — Sudan Tribune · Sudanese independent, Paris-based
- Sudan's army claims control of major highway linking Khartoum and el-Obeid — Al Jazeera · Qatari state-funded
- Sudan army says RSF advance on key town bordering Ethiopia — Al Jazeera · Qatari state-funded
- RSF Counters Recent SAF Gains in Sudan: Africa File, August 20, 2026 — Critical Threats Project · Project of the American Enterprise Institute, a U.S. conservative think tank; hawkish on state sponsorship of armed proxies
- Besieged Sudanese city faces relentless drone strikes and risk of mass atrocities, U.N. warns — NPR · U.S. public radio, center-left newsroom, partly member- and grant-funded
- Sudan Nashra: In cross-border offensive, RSF seizes Blue Nile's Geisan, recaptures Kurmuk — Mada Masr · Egyptian independent outlet, repeatedly blocked and prosecuted by the Egyptian state
- Sudan: Attacks and further displacement in Blue Nile and North Kordofan — UN News · United Nations in-house news service
- RSF accepts truce but rejects withdrawal in response to U.S. Sudan peace plan — Sudan Tribune · Sudanese independent, Paris-based
- US and Sudan clash at UN over rejected humanitarian truce claims — Sudan Tribune · Sudanese independent, Paris-based
- H.R.1939 - 119th Congress (2025-2026): U.S. Engagement in Sudanese Peace Act — Congress.gov · Official U.S. legislative record, Library of Congress
- New report cites evidence of alleged military assistance to RSF from Ethiopian base, raising regional security concerns — Addis Standard · Ethiopian independent magazine, often critical of the Ethiopian federal government
- Sudanese army recaptures Bara city, other strategic areas in North Kordofan — Ahram Online · Egyptian state-owned; Egypt backs Sudan's armed forces
- IOM: 200k+ displaced across Kordofan as fighting intensifies — Dabanga Radio TV · Sudanese exile media, funded largely by Dutch and other European donors
- Trump Senior Adviser to Asharq Al-Awsat: No Military Solution in Sudan — Asharq Al-Awsat · Pan-Arab daily owned by Saudi royal-linked SRMG; reflects Saudi diplomatic positioning
- El-Obeid under siege by RSF: Could this be Sudan's next el-Fasher? — Al Jazeera · Qatari state-funded
- US Congress Should Pass Legislation on Sudan — Human Rights Watch · U.S.-based international human rights advocacy group, foundation- and donor-funded; advocacy, not neutral analysis
- US Report: Ethiopia Army Base Used to Support Sudan's RSF — Asharq Al-Awsat · Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily