Victory Capital Agrees to Buy First Eagle Investments for About $7 Billion
The August 26 agreement pairs roughly $4.4 billion in cash with about $2 billion in new Victory stock, and the companies say the combined firm would manage about $571 billion.
The $571 Billion Number Isn't the Deal
On August 26, 2026, Victory Capital Holdings agreed to buy First Eagle Investments for about $7 billion[1][3]. The company's own headline announcing it doesn't lead with that price. It leads with $571 billion — the size of the combined firm once the deal closes[1].
That's not an accident. The $571 billion figure is assets under management, a number that sounds big and obligates Victory to nothing[1]. The price tag, the new debt, and how Victory plans to pay for all of it sit further down the release[1][2].
Strip away the framing and the terms are straightforward. Victory will pay roughly $4.4 billion in cash and hand over about $2.0 billion in newly issued stock, priced at $116.26 a share[1][2]. It will also take on $575 million of First Eagle debt that pays 7.25% interest and comes due in 2032[1]. Together, the two firms would manage about $571 billion and pull in roughly $3.2 billion a year in revenue[1][3].
Investors liked what they saw. Victory's shares jumped as much as 6% that day, touching a 52-week high[3][9].
Why a Fund That Locks Up Money Is Worth More Than One That Doesn't
The real prize for Victory isn't First Eagle's size. It's a specific business First Eagle already runs and Victory doesn't have: a $41 billion platform in collateralized loan obligations, or CLOs, and other private credit[1][4].
A CLO takes a pool of loans made to heavily indebted companies, bundles them together, and sells slices to investors. The safest slices get paid first; the riskiest slices absorb losses first but earn the highest returns. Managing that kind of fund pays higher, stickier fees than running an ordinary stock fund, because the money is locked up for years instead of able to leave the moment a quarter goes badly[1].
That's the deeper pressure driving this deal. Index funds and ETFs have pushed down what investors will pay for plain stock and bond management. A firm that can't raise its prices can only grow profit by managing more money over the same fixed costs, or by moving into products that still command real fees. This deal does both at once[1][4].
There's also a clock running in the background that has nothing to do with strategy. Genstar Capital, a private-equity firm, bought majority control of First Eagle in August 2025, taking over from Blackstone and Corsair, who'd held it since 2015[5][12]. Private-equity owners answer to their own investors on a fixed timeline. That deadline exists no matter what either company says publicly about long-term partnership.
The Debt Is a Contract. The Savings Are a Forecast.
Here's where the story gets genuinely contested, not just spun. Victory is borrowing about $4.45 billion to help fund this deal, arranged by Bank of America and RBC Capital Markets — a $3.5 billion term loan plus roughly $950 million in new secured notes[2]. Victory says its net debt will sit at 3.2 times adjusted EBITDA at closing, a rough measure of operating cash flow, before falling to about two times by the end of 2028[3].
Supporters point to two numbers: $280 million in projected annual cost savings, and about 35% growth in Victory's 2027 adjusted earnings per share[1][3]. Both numbers come from Victory itself[1][3].
That distinction matters. The synergies and the earnings boost are projections. The $4.45 billion of new borrowing is a contract[2]. Interest payments come due whether the savings materialize or not, and that's exactly why leverage turns an optimistic forecast into an obligation.
There's recent history worth weighing here, too. Five months before this deal, in March 2026, Victory withdrew a nearly $9 billion unsolicited bid for Janus Henderson Group after a rival offer from Trian Fund Management and General Catalyst pushed the price to $52 a share[15]. Janus Henderson's board backed the rival bid, citing what it called "unacceptably high closing risks" in Victory's proposal[15]. That track record doesn't tell you whether this deal will work, but it's relevant context for judging how much confidence to place in Victory's own forecasts this time.
The Question First Eagle's Own Fund Holders Are Asking
Not everyone watching this deal cares about earnings accretion. Fund shareholders, financial advisers, and clients are asking a narrower question: does anything change in my fund?
Their leverage here is legal, not just rhetorical. Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, a change of control automatically ends a fund's advisory contract — it's called an "assignment"[2]. That means First Eagle's fund boards have to actively decide the new owner is fit to manage the money, and in some cases shareholders get a vote[2]. It's a real checkpoint, not a formality, and it's part of why the deal isn't expected to close until the end of the first quarter of 2027[1][2].
Morningstar, which rates many of the funds involved, has raised the sharper version of this concern. It notes that 92% of First Eagle's rated fund assets carry four- or five-star ratings, and asks what happens to that track record under an owner now carrying billions in new debt[4]. Victory's counter is that it has historically left acquired investment teams and their processes alone, letting each keep its own brand while sharing back-office and compliance costs[1][4].
Genstar, for its part, isn't simply cashing out. It's set to hold about 14.6% of Victory's stock on a fully diluted basis, with voting power capped at 4.9% and two of eleven board seats[1][5][12]. That structure ties Genstar's return to Victory's stock price holding up, rather than locking in a clean exit.
A Bet on Private Credit, Made as Regulators Start Watching It
Zoom out, and this deal is also a data point in a bigger debate about private credit itself. The business Victory is buying into — CLOs and other private lending outside the traditional banking system — has grown fast because it pays well and locks up client money for years[1][11].
That growth hasn't gone unnoticed. The Financial Stability Board, an international group of central banks and regulators, warned in a May 2026 report about valuation uncertainty and liquidity mismatch in private credit[11]. In the first quarter of 2026, some credit funds faced a wave of investor withdrawal requests and had to impose gates limiting how much money could leave at once[11].
Industry voices counter that scale cuts the other way: bigger platforms have stronger loan-sourcing relationships and tighter underwriting standards than small ones, and CLOs are structurally built to absorb losses in order, with junior investors taking the first hit[11]. Whether Victory can pay its new debt down from 3.2 times EBITDA to about two times by the end of 2028 depends heavily on this fee stream holding up through whatever comes next for the asset class[3][11].
What Nobody Pitching This Deal Wants to Lead With
Coverage of the deal has split less along political lines — there's no meaningful left-right divide here — and more along who's telling the story. Victory's own release leads with the $571 billion figure, the number that "sounds biggest and carries no obligation," while the $4.45 billion in acquisition debt and the 3.2x leverage ratio sit well below the fold. Bloomberg's coverage led cleanly with the price and the stock pop, giving less space to the fund-consent process[3]. PitchBook framed the deal as a step toward a $1 trillion target Victory hasn't reached, adopting the company's own ambition as the yardstick[9]. Trade outlets overseas, including the UK's Investment Week, covered it as routine global consolidation news, with less attention to the U.S. regulatory mechanics around fund consent[7][14].
None of that changes the underlying numbers. What's still unknown is how much client money stays through the consent process, whether $280 million in savings is achievable without hurting fund performance, and whether private-credit fees hold up through a period regulators have already flagged for stress[2][11]. The deal has roughly seven months to run before it's set to close, and the fund boards and clients who have to sign off haven't weighed in yet[1][2].
Summary
On August 26, 2026, Victory Capital Holdings said it had agreed to buy First Eagle Investments for about $7 billion[1][3]. Victory would pay roughly $4.4 billion in cash and about $2.0 billion in newly issued Victory shares, priced at $116.26 each[1][2]. It would also take on $575 million of First Eagle debt that pays 7.25% interest and comes due in 2032[1]. The two firms together would manage about $571 billion for clients — First Eagle brings roughly $222 billion of that[1][4]. The deal is expected to close by the end of the first quarter of 2027[1].
Victory is buying scale and a business it does not have. First Eagle runs a $41 billion platform in collateralized loan obligations, or CLOs, and other private credit[1][4]. A CLO is a fund that buys a pool of loans made to companies with heavy debt, bundles them, and sells slices to investors — the safest slices get paid first, the riskiest slices absorb losses first but earn the most. Managing CLOs pays higher fees than running an ordinary stock fund, and those fees are stickier, because the money is locked up for years instead of leaving on a bad quarter. That is the prize Victory says it is paying for[1].
The main point of genuine dispute is not whether the deal makes strategic sense. It is whether the debt behind it is prudent. Victory is borrowing about $4.45 billion, arranged by Bank of America and RBC Capital Markets, through a $3.5 billion term loan and roughly $950 million of new secured notes[2]. Victory says net debt would sit at 3.2 times adjusted EBITDA — a rough measure of operating cash flow — at closing, then fall to about two times by the end of 2028[3]. Supporters point to $280 million in promised annual cost savings and about 35% growth in 2027 adjusted earnings per share[1][3]. Skeptics note that both of those numbers are Victory's own forecasts, and that borrowed money makes any miss hurt more[3][4].
The deal is not final. Victory's shareholders must approve issuing the new stock[2]. Regulators must sign off. And because a change of control legally ends First Eagle's contracts to manage its mutual funds, fund boards and clients have to agree to hire the new owner[2]. Genstar Capital, First Eagle's private-equity owner since August 2025, would end up holding about 14.6% of Victory and two of eleven board seats — with its voting power capped at 4.9%[1][5][12].
The Event
On August 26, 2026, Victory Capital Holdings announced a definitive agreement to acquire First Eagle Investments in a transaction valued at about $7.0 billion[1][3]. The consideration is approximately $4.4 billion in cash and about $2.0 billion in newly issued Victory Capital equity valued at $116.26 per share, and Victory will assume $575 million of First Eagle's 7.25% senior secured notes due 2032[1][2]. Victory said the combined firm would manage about $571 billion and generate roughly $3.2 billion in annual revenue, with First Eagle keeping its brand and operating on Victory's platform[1][3]. Victory shares rose as much as 6% that day, touching a 52-week high[3][9].
Undisputed Facts
- Victory Capital and First Eagle announced a definitive merger agreement on August 26, 2026, valued at approximately $7.0 billion[1][3].
- The price is about $4.4 billion in cash plus roughly $2.0 billion in newly issued Victory shares at $116.26 per share, with Victory assuming $575 million of First Eagle 7.25% senior secured notes due 2032[1][2].
- First Eagle manages about $222 billion, including a $41 billion CLO and alternative-credit platform; the combined firm would manage about $571 billion[1][4].
- Financing is fully committed by Bank of America Securities and RBC Capital Markets: a $3.5 billion term loan B, about $950 million of new secured notes, and an upsized $200 million revolving credit facility[2].
- Victory projects about $280 million of annual net expense synergies, full realization within two years, and roughly 35% accretion to estimated 2027 adjusted earnings per share[1][3].
- Victory states pro forma net leverage of 3.2 times adjusted EBITDA at closing, declining to about two times by the end of 2028[3].
- Genstar Capital acquired a majority stake in First Eagle from Blackstone, Corsair and co-investors, closing in August 2025; under this deal Genstar would hold about 14.6% of Victory on a fully diluted basis, with voting limited to 4.9%, and two of eleven board seats[5][12][4].
- Closing is targeted by the end of the first quarter of 2027 and requires regulatory approvals, Victory shareholder approval of the share issuance, and fund board and client consents, because the change of control is an 'assignment' that automatically terminates existing fund advisory agreements under the Investment Company Act of 1940[1][2].
- First Eagle agreed in April 2026 to acquire the roughly $27 billion boutique manager Diamond Hill[4].
- Victory withdrew a nearly $9 billion unsolicited proposal to acquire Janus Henderson Group in March 2026, after Trian Fund Management and General Catalyst raised a rival offer to $52 a share and Janus Henderson's board backed that revised deal, citing 'unacceptably high closing risks' in Victory's proposal[15].
The Pressure
Strip away the moralizing and blame. What structural realities persist regardless of which narrative wins?
- Fee compression forces size
- Index funds and ETFs have pushed down what investors will pay for ordinary stock and bond management. A firm that cannot raise prices can only grow profit by managing more money over the same fixed costs, or by moving into products that still command high fees. This deal does both at once[1][4].
- Private credit is where the fees still are
- CLO and private-credit money is contractually locked up for years and carries higher management fees than public-market funds. That is why a $41 billion credit platform can justify a large share of a $7 billion price — the revenue is both richer and harder for clients to walk away from[1][11].
- The private-equity clock
- Genstar bought majority control of First Eagle in August 2025, taking over from Blackstone and Corsair, who had held it since 2015[5][12]. Private-equity funds must return money to their own investors on a schedule. That structural deadline exists whatever either party says about long-term partnership.
- Debt makes forecasts binding
- The $280 million of expense synergies and the 35% earnings accretion are Victory's projections[1][3]. The roughly $4.45 billion of borrowing is a contract[2]. Interest payments come due whether or not the savings arrive, which is why leverage converts an optimistic forecast into an obligation.
- Clients hold a real veto
- Because a change of control ends fund advisory contracts by operation of law, First Eagle's fund boards and separate-account clients must actively re-consent[2]. Assets that leave during that window reduce exactly the fee base the debt is sized against.
- This deal follows a failed one
- Five months before agreeing to buy First Eagle, Victory withdrew a nearly $9 billion unsolicited bid for Janus Henderson after Janus's board judged the proposal too risky to close and backed a rival offer instead[15]. That track record is directly relevant to how much confidence to place in Victory's own forecasts for this deal, since it shows Victory has both an aggressive appetite for large acquisitions and a recent instance where a target's board found its terms unworkable.
Material realityTwo asset managers signed a binding agreement on August 26, 2026. Victory Capital will pay about $7.0 billion — roughly $4.4 billion cash, about $2.0 billion in new shares at $116.26 — and assume $575 million of 7.25% notes due 2032[1][2]. To fund it, Victory has committed financing from Bank of America Securities and RBC Capital Markets: a $3.5 billion term loan B, about $950 million of new secured notes and an upsized $200 million revolver[2]. First Eagle brings about $222 billion in client money, including $41 billion in CLOs and alternative credit; the combined firm would manage about $571 billion and earn roughly $3.2 billion a year in revenue[1][3]. Net debt would be 3.2 times adjusted EBITDA at closing[3]. None of that changes based on how the deal is described. What is genuinely unknown is how much client money stays through the consent process, whether $280 million of cost savings is achievable without harming the funds, and whether private-credit fee income holds up through a period the Financial Stability Board has flagged for valuation and liquidity strain[2][11]. It is also worth weighing this deal against Victory's most recent prior attempt at a large acquisition: its nearly $9 billion bid for Janus Henderson, withdrawn in March 2026 after Janus's board called it too risky to close[15].
Narrative as a weaponVictory Capital is the most active shaper of perception here, and it wants you to focus on $571 billion — a number that signals strength and commits it to nothing. Genstar's own release echoes the same framing, because Genstar is now a Victory shareholder and benefits from the same story[5]. Trade press has largely relayed the company's numbers, with the sharpest independent line coming from Morningstar, which calls it a 'bet' and asks what fund holders get — while itself supplying the star ratings Victory cites as proof of quality[4]. The debt is the part nobody has an incentive to lead with: not the buyer, not the seller, not the banks earning fees on $4.45 billion of financing. Also underplayed industry-wide is Victory's own recent M&A history — its unsolicited, ultimately withdrawn $9 billion bid for Janus Henderson five months earlier — even though PitchBook's own coverage of this deal mentions it in passing[9][15]. Readers should also note that the deal will not close for roughly seven months, and that the consent process gives clients and fund boards a decision point that no press release can settle in advance[1][2].
How Each Side Sees It
Each major actor’s view — how it frames things, its underlying incentive, and how it’s materially affected. Tap a side to read it.
Frames it asVictory argues that scale is now the price of admission in asset management. Distributors keep shrinking their approved lists, so a firm needs many strategies under one roof to stay on the shelf. Victory says its model — let each investment franchise keep its own brand and its own investment decisions, while sharing one back office, one compliance stack and one sales force — is exactly why costs can come out without damaging performance[1][4]. It points to a specific gap it is filling: it did not have a serious private-credit business, and First Eagle's $41 billion CLO platform becomes the combined firm's alternatives arm on day one rather than something built from scratch over a decade[1]. On the debt, Victory's case is that asset-management cash flows are fee-based and recurring, which is why lenders committed $4.45 billion up front, and that leverage of 3.2 times falling to about two times by end-2028 is a temporary condition, not a permanent one[2][3].
WhyVictory has grown by buying managers, and executives have publicly framed a path toward $1 trillion in assets[9]. Each deal spreads fixed costs over more money and raises earnings per share, which supports the share price and management's own equity[1][3]. This deal also follows a setback: five months earlier, in March 2026, Victory withdrew a nearly $9 billion unsolicited bid for Janus Henderson after Janus's board backed a rival offer and judged Victory's proposal too risky to close[15]. That history is relevant to how much weight to put on Victory's own accretion and synergy forecasts here.
Impact on themVictory takes on about $4.45 billion in new borrowing and issues roughly $2.0 billion in stock, diluting existing holders[2]. If the $280 million in savings and the client base both hold, Victory says 2027 adjusted EPS rises about 35%[1]. Shares rose as much as 6% to a 52-week high on the news[3][9].
Frames it asFirst Eagle's leadership presents this as an exit from private-equity ownership rather than a surrender. Private-equity owners work to a fund clock — they need an exit within a set number of years, which can push short-term decisions. First Eagle argues that joining a permanently capitalized public company removes that clock and gives its long-horizon value-investing teams more room[4]. It also stresses continuity as the actual test: it keeps its own brand, its own investment process and its own portfolio managers, which is the arrangement Victory has used with prior acquisitions[1][4]. First Eagle's supporters note it was not a distressed seller — 92% of its rated mutual fund and ETF assets hold a four- or five-star Morningstar rating, and it was itself buying, having agreed in April 2026 to acquire the $27 billion manager Diamond Hill[1][4].
WhyManagement wants scale and distribution it cannot buy alone, and a stable owner after a decade of changing hands — Blackstone and Corsair from 2015, then Genstar from August 2025[5][12].
Impact on themFirst Eagle's advisory contracts with its funds legally end at closing and must be re-approved, putting its client relationships briefly in play[2]. Employees face the cost cuts implied by $280 million of net expense synergies[1].
Frames it asGenstar's case is that it did what a growth investor is supposed to do: it bought a majority of First Eagle in 2025, backed an expansion including the Diamond Hill deal, and is now converting a private stake into a stake in a larger public platform rather than cashing out entirely[5][12]. Taking roughly 14.6% of Victory in stock, with voting capped at 4.9% and two of eleven board seats, is offered as evidence of continued alignment — Genstar only wins if Victory's shares hold up[1][4].
WhyGenstar needs a return for its own fund investors within a defined timeframe. A part-cash, part-stock exit locks in value now while keeping upside.
Impact on themGenstar becomes one of Victory's largest holders roughly a year and a half after buying into First Eagle[5][12]. The 4.9% voting cap limits its formal control despite the larger economic stake[1].
Frames it asThis group's central question is different from the market's. It is not 'does the deal add to earnings' but 'does anything change in my fund.' Their strongest argument is procedural and rooted in law: under the Investment Company Act of 1940, a change of control is an 'assignment' that automatically kills the advisory contract, so fund boards must affirmatively decide the new owner is a suitable manager and shareholders may be asked to vote[2]. That is a real check, not a formality. Skeptics in this camp add a substantive worry — a buyer carrying about $4.45 billion of acquisition debt has a standing reason to cut costs, and research and portfolio-management staffing are costs[2][4]. Supporters counter that Victory has historically left acquired investment teams alone, and that a bigger platform can mean lower fund expense ratios and broader access[1][4].
WhyPreserve fund performance, keep the managers whose track records they bought, and avoid fee increases.
Impact on themFund holders will receive proxy or board-consent materials before closing[2]. Nothing changes in their holdings unless boards approve the new adviser and, in some cases, shareholders vote[2].
Frames it asThis camp treats the deal as a data point in a larger question about private credit. Their argument is that the CLO and private-credit business is precisely what is being consolidated because it earns the highest and stickiest fees — and that this is happening while the asset class faces its first real stress test. They cite the Financial Stability Board's May 6, 2026 report on vulnerabilities in private credit, which flags valuation uncertainty and liquidity mismatch, and the first-quarter 2026 episode in which credit funds faced withdrawal requests and some imposed gates to limit outflows[11]. The counterargument from within the industry is that scale is protective, not risky: larger platforms have better loan-sourcing relationships and stricter underwriting than small ones, and CLO structures are built to absorb defaults by design, because losses hit the junior slices before the senior ones[11].
WhyRegulators want to see whether risk is migrating into less-supervised corners of finance. Credit investors want to know whether the fee stream Victory is borrowing against is durable.
Impact on themVictory's ability to pay down debt from 3.2 times to about two times by end-2028 depends on CLO and credit fees holding up[3][11]. A credit downturn would squeeze both the fees and the borrower.
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The Bias Ledger average rating 3.6
The same story, as framed by outlets across the spectrum, ordered least to most biased. The bias score (1 = straight, 10 = heavily spun) is an AI assessment of that framing — click an outlet to see its track record. The tell is the word choice or omission that reveals the angle.
| Outlet | Vantage | Bias | How they frame it | The tell |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bloomberg | U.S. center, markets desk | 2 | "Victory Capital to Acquire First Eagle in $7 Billion Asset Management Deal" | Clean transactional headline with the price in it. The framing tell is emphasis: deal mechanics and the share-price pop lead; the fund-shareholder consent requirement and the debt load are secondary or absent. |
| Pensions & Investments | U.S. institutional asset-management trade press | 2 | "Victory Capital Holdings to acquire First Eagle Investments in $7 billion deal" | Flat, terms-first reporting for a professional audience. The omission characteristic of trade coverage is the retail investor — the reader is assumed to be an allocator, not a fund holder. |
| Investment Week | UK asset-management trade press | 2 | "Victory Capital Holdings to acquire First Eagle Investments for $7bn" | Neutral and terms-first. The overseas tell is scale framing — the combined AUM figure and global consolidation, with less attention to U.S. regulatory consent mechanics. |
| Morningstar | U.S. investment-research firm; rates the funds involved, so not a disinterested observer | 4 | "Victory Capital Makes Its Biggest Bet Yet" | 'Bet' is the editorial word — it imports risk that the company's own release does not concede. Morningstar is also the source of the '92% four- or five-star' statistic that Victory quotes in its release, so it is grading a transaction involving its own ratings. |
| Bond Buyer | U.S. fixed-income trade press | 4 | "Victory Capital acquiring high-yield giant First Eagle" | 'High-yield giant' recasts a diversified $222 billion manager as primarily a credit shop. That is the angle its bond-market readership cares about, but it overstates the share of First Eagle that is credit — $41 billion of about $222 billion. |
| PitchBook | U.S. private-markets data provider | 5 | "Victory Capital takes another step toward $1T with First Eagle acquisition" | Frames a completed agreement in terms of a target the company has not reached — $1 trillion. That is trajectory framing: it points the reader at a forecast rather than the transaction, and it adopts management's stated ambition as the story's measuring stick. |
| Victory Capital | Company primary source (buyer) | 6 | "Victory Capital to Acquire First Eagle Investments, Creating a $571 Billion Diversified Global Asset Manager" | The headline number is the one that sounds biggest and carries no obligation — assets under management, not price or debt. The $4.45 billion of committed acquisition financing and the 3.2x leverage appear well below the fold. 'Creating' frames a merger as construction. |
References
- Victory Capital to Acquire First Eagle Investments, Creating a $571 Billion Diversified Global Asset Manager — Victory Capital Holdings · Primary source — the acquiring company's own investor-relations release
- Victory Capital Holdings, Inc. — Form DEFA14A (FY2026) — U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (EDGAR) · Primary source — mandatory proxy filing; company-authored but legally binding as to terms and risk disclosures
- Victory Capital to Acquire First Eagle in $7 Billion Asset Management Deal — Bloomberg · U.S. financial newswire; subscription/terminal-funded, market-practitioner audience
- Victory Capital Makes Its Biggest Bet Yet — Morningstar · U.S. for-profit investment research firm; earns revenue from fund ratings and data, and rates the funds in this deal
- Victory Capital to Acquire First Eagle Investments, Creating a $571 Billion Diversified Global Asset Manager — Genstar Capital · Primary source — the selling private-equity owner's own release; a direct financial interest in the framing
- Victory Capital Holdings to acquire First Eagle Investments in $7 billion deal — Pensions & Investments · U.S. institutional-investing trade publication; advertiser-supported, allocator audience
- Victory Capital Holdings to acquire First Eagle Investments for $7bn — Investment Week · UK asset-management trade press; adviser and fund-industry audience
- Victory Capital acquiring high-yield giant First Eagle — Bond Buyer · U.S. fixed-income trade publication; bond-market practitioner audience
- Victory Capital takes another step toward $1T with First Eagle acquisition — PitchBook · U.S. private-markets data provider owned by Morningstar; sells data to the firms it covers
- Victory Capital to Acquire First Eagle Investments — Chief Investment Officer · U.S. institutional-investor trade publication
- Report on Vulnerabilities in Private Credit, 6 May 2026 — Financial Stability Board · International body of central banks and financial regulators hosted by the Bank for International Settlements; regulator-facing, structurally inclined toward flagging systemic risk
- Genstar To Buy Majority Stake In First Eagle From Blackstone, Corsair — Wealth Solutions Report · U.S. wealth-management trade publication; advertiser-supported industry news
- First Eagle Investments Announces Closing of Majority Investment by Genstar Capital — Genstar Capital · Primary source — acquirer's own release announcing the August 2025 closing
- Victory Capital to Buy First Eagle Investments for $7bn — Markets Media · U.S. capital-markets trade publication; sponsor-supported
- Victory Capital Pulls Janus Henderson Offer, Ending Bidding War — Bloomberg · U.S. financial newswire; subscription/terminal-funded, market-practitioner audience