EverBank and WaFd Agree to $3.9 Billion Reverse Merger, Creating a Bank With About $75 Billion in Assets
Under the deal announced Sept. 7, EverBank's investors would own about 59.2% of the combined company, which would keep the EverBank name and trade on Nasdaq as EVBK after an expected early-2027 close.
A Bank With 43 Branches Is About to Take Over the Bank With 210
EverBank has almost no branches. It has $46.7 billion in assets and just 43 physical locations, built mostly as a digital, branchless lender[6]. WaFd has about 210 branches spread across nine western states[6][7]. On the evening of Monday, Sept. 7, 2026, the two agreed to merge — and the smaller-branch bank is coming out on top.
The deal is worth $3.9 billion, paid entirely in stock[1][6]. Structurally, it is a "reverse merger": EverBank, the bigger and privately held company, folds into WaFd, the smaller public one[1][3]. WaFd survives on paper as the legal entity. But it then renames itself EverBank Financial Corp, adopts EverBank's Nasdaq ticker, EVBK, and hands the CEO job to EverBank's Greg Seibly, while WaFd's own CEO, Brent Beardall, steps down to president[1][3][6]. EverBank's owners end up with about 59.2% of the combined company. WaFd's shareholders get about 40.8%[1][3].
Put together, the new bank would hold roughly $75 billion in assets, $58 billion in loans and $59 billion in deposits[6]. More than 82% of those deposits fall under the FDIC's $250,000 insurance limit, which matters because it means most depositors are unlikely to pull their money in a panic — a lesson banks took seriously after the 2023 regional-bank failures[6]. The bank's charter and headquarters will sit in Jacksonville, Florida. The public holding company will stay based in Bellevue, Washington[7]. Closing is expected in early 2027, and still needs regulators and WaFd shareholders to sign off[1][6].
The Whole Deal Comes Down to One Spread
To understand why this merger exists at all, you need to understand how a bank actually makes money. It borrows from depositors at one rate and lends that money out at a higher one. The gap between those two rates is the bank's core profit engine.
EverBank built its deposit base online, where savers hunt for the best rate and move their money the moment a competitor beats it. That kind of money is "hot" — cheap to attract with a promotion, but expensive to keep and quick to flee[6][7]. Branch deposits work differently. People leave money in a checking account near their house because it's convenient, not because of the interest rate, so it costs the bank less and sticks around longer[6][7].
That is the trade at the center of this deal. EverBank gets access to WaFd's roughly 210 branches and their cheaper, stickier deposits. WaFd, in turn, gets a faster path out of its old identity as a savings-and-loan — a type of bank built mainly around home mortgages — and into full-service commercial banking, something it has been trying to build on its own for years[6]. Neither side is disguising this. Management says the combination should save about $135 million a year and lift WaFd shareholders' 2027 earnings per share by roughly 29%[1][10].
There's also a less advertised force behind the timing. The consortium that owns EverBank — funds tied to Stone Point Capital, Warburg Pincus, Reverence Capital Partners, Sixth Street and Bayview Asset Management, plus a minority stake held by TIAA — bought the bank from TIAA in August 2023[14]. Private equity funds don't hold investments forever; they need an exit. Merging into an already-public company is a quicker, more certain way to convert a private stake into tradable stock than launching an IPO from scratch[1][14].
Regulators Just Opened a Door That Was Closed a Year Ago
None of this would make sense on the same timeline five years ago. In 2025, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the FDIC rescinded merger-review policies put in place under the Biden administration and went back to older, faster approval frameworks[11][12]. Regulators, including the Fed's vice chair for bank supervision, have publicly said they want quicker, more predictable decisions on bank mergers, especially for regional and community-sized institutions[11][12].
Law firms that represent banks in these deals, including Skadden and Reed Smith, describe 2026 as an unusually favorable window for approval[11][12]. That reading isn't universal. American Banker's opinion page has argued that a faster, deadline-driven review process can't replace a genuine look at what a merger does to competition and to the communities a bank serves[15].
That debate isn't hypothetical for WaFd. In 2023, when it tried to buy Luther Burbank Savings, 54 nonprofits led by the California Reinvestment Coalition — now called Rise Economy — formally asked the FDIC to block the deal[8][9]. Their evidence was specific: racial and ethnic gaps in Luther Burbank's mortgage lending, WaFd's own lending to the oil-and-gas industry, and two Consumer Financial Protection Bureau penalties against WaFd totaling $234,000 for errors in mortgage data the agency said could interfere with tracking discrimination[8][9]. The FDIC approved that deal anyway. The CFPB, for its part, terminated both of those penalty orders early in September 2025, saying WaFd had completed its remediation plan — a resolution that predates this new merger by about a year[8][9].
No comparable coalition has been reported opposing the EverBank deal yet. Whether that means no objection is coming, or simply that it hasn't been filed yet, is impossible to say from the record so far.
Wall Street Can't Agree on Whether WaFd Won or Lost
The morning after the announcement, WaFd's stock told one story: down 5.3%, to $34.36[13]. A Piper Sandler analyst told a different one, calling the combination "a logical" one that should let both banks earn more together than they could separately[6].
Both readings rest on real numbers, they're just different numbers. The bullish case points to that 29% projected jump in 2027 earnings per share and a tangible book value earn-back — the standard test of whether a deal pays for itself — of under two years[1][10]. Tangible book value is roughly what would be left for shareholders if a bank sold everything it owns and paid off its debts, excluding intangible assets like goodwill; acquisitions typically shrink it temporarily, so a fast earn-back is read as evidence the price wasn't too high[1][10].
The bearish case points to control, not arithmetic. In a reverse merger, WaFd's own shareholders go from owning all of their company to owning a 40.8% minority stake in a bigger one, run by leadership drawn mostly from the other side of the deal[1][6][13]. That kind of dilution is a common trigger for a stock sale, regardless of what the earnings projections say[13]. And those projections are still just that — projections. The $135 million in promised cost savings hasn't been itemized publicly, and no branch-closing or staffing plan has been released by either company[1][10].
Two Cities, Two Headlines, Same Merger
How this story got framed depended heavily on which city was telling it. Seattle-area outlet MyNorthwest wrote that WaFd was "entering" the merger and stressed that the parent company stays in Bellevue, casting the local bank as the one making a choice[2]. Jacksonville Today did the reverse: it led with EverBank merging with an unnamed "Seattle-based financial institution," and emphasized that the bank charter and headquarters land in Jacksonville[7]. Neither framing is inaccurate. Both are picking the half of the split structure that keeps their hometown looking like the winner.
Elsewhere, word choice did some quiet editorial work. Reuters used the neutral verb "combine" and listed EverBank first, which — intentionally or not — reflects who ends up controlling the company[1]. Hoodline went further, writing that EverBank would "absorb" WaFd, the strongest verb any outlet used for a deal in which WaFd is technically the surviving legal entity and its CEO stays on as president[1][6]. AlphaStreet led entirely with the stock drop and added unattributed analysis about shareholder "uncertainty," presenting one plausible interpretation as settled fact[13]. American Banker, the trade outlet most focused on the industry mechanics, laid out both banks' weaknesses clearly but wrote almost entirely from the perspective of management and investors, with little space for what the deal might mean for depositors or branch communities[6].
What Happens Between Now and Early 2027
For now, nothing changes for a customer of either bank. The merger can't close until regulators approve it and WaFd's shareholders vote yes, and the companies aren't targeting a close until early 2027[1][6]. Whatever cost savings get promised on paper will eventually have to come from somewhere real — likely some mix of overlapping back-office jobs, duplicate technology contracts, and, if bank-merger history is a guide, branch closures neither company has yet announced[10].
The open question isn't really about the math. Analysts on both sides of the stock-price divide are working from the same set of projected numbers. It's about who else weighs in before the vote — regulators moving through a newly loosened approval process, WaFd's own shareholders deciding whether the projected upside is worth losing control, and any community groups that may yet raise the kind of objections that trailed WaFd's last acquisition[1][6][8][9][11].
Summary
On the evening of Monday, Sept. 7, 2026, two banks agreed to combine. Jacksonville-based EverBank Financial Corp and Bellevue, Washington-based WaFd, Inc. announced a $3.9 billion all-stock deal[1][6]. The result would hold roughly $75 billion in assets, about $58 billion in loans and about $59 billion in deposits[6].
The structure is unusual, and the label matters. It is a "reverse merger": EverBank, the bigger and privately held bank, folds into WaFd, the smaller public one. WaFd survives on paper, but then takes EverBank's name, EverBank's CEO, and a new Nasdaq ticker, EVBK[1][3]. In plain terms, the smaller public company is the legal shell and the larger private one gets the wheel. EverBank's owners would hold about 59.2% of the shares; WaFd's holders about 40.8%[1][3]. EverBank CEO Greg Seibly becomes CEO. WaFd CEO Brent Beardall becomes president[1][6].
Each side says the deal fixes a real weakness. EverBank grew as a digital-first, largely branchless bank, so it pays up for deposits; WaFd's roughly 210 branches across nine states bring cheaper, stickier ones[6][7]. WaFd, for its part, is still shedding its old savings-and-loan identity and wants a faster route into commercial banking[6]. Management projects about $135 million a year in cost savings and roughly 29% higher 2027 earnings per share for WaFd holders[1][10].
The genuine dispute is over who is paying for that. Supporters, including a Piper Sandler analyst, call it a logical fit that should earn better returns than either bank could alone[6]. But WaFd shareholders are handing majority control to a group of private-equity funds — Stone Point Capital, Warburg Pincus, Reverence Capital Partners, Sixth Street and Bayview Asset Management, plus a non-controlling TIAA stake — and WaFd stock fell 5.3% to $34.36 the day after the announcement[13][14]. A third question sits outside the market: community groups fought WaFd's last acquisition at the FDIC, and no comparable public campaign has yet been reported against this one[8][9].
The Event
EverBank Financial Corp and WaFd, Inc. announced a definitive merger agreement late on Sept. 7, 2026, valuing the combination at $3.9 billion in an all-stock reverse merger[1][6]. Under the agreement, EverBank Financial Corp merges into WaFd, Inc., which survives as the public holding company, renames itself EverBank Financial Corp, and moves to the Nasdaq ticker EVBK[1][3]. WaFd's bank subsidiary is to merge into EverBank, N.A., which will be chartered and headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida, while the public holding company remains based in Bellevue, Washington[7]. The companies said they expect to close in early 2027, subject to regulatory approval, approval by WaFd shareholders, and customary conditions[1][6].
Undisputed Facts
- The deal was announced on Sept. 7, 2026, and is valued at $3.9 billion in stock[1][6].
- EverBank's existing investors would hold about 59.175% of the combined company on a fully diluted basis; WaFd shareholders about 40.825%[1][3].
- The combined bank would have roughly $75 billion in assets, about $58 billion in loans and about $59 billion in deposits, with more than 82% of deposits FDIC-insured[6].
- EverBank had about $46.7 billion in assets before the deal and, per FDIC data, 43 branches; WaFd operated roughly 210 offices across nine states[6][7].
- EverBank CEO Greg Seibly is designated CEO of the combined company; WaFd CEO Brent Beardall is designated president[1][6].
- The companies project about $135 million in annual run-rate cost savings, roughly 29% 2027 earnings-per-share accretion for WaFd holders, tangible book value earn-back of under two years, and about 15% return on tangible common equity after full synergies[1][10].
- EverBank's owners are funds managed by Stone Point Capital, Warburg Pincus, Reverence Capital Partners, Sixth Street and Bayview Asset Management, along with a non-controlling stake retained by TIAA, which sold the bank to that group in August 2023[14].
- WaFd shares fell 5.3% to $34.36 on Tuesday, Sept. 8, 2026, the first trading day after the announcement[13].
- The transaction requires regulatory approval and a WaFd shareholder vote before it can close[1][6].
The Pressure
Strip away the moralizing and blame. What structural realities persist regardless of which narrative wins?
- Deposit cost is the whole game
- A bank's profit starts with the gap between what it pays for deposits and what it earns on loans. EverBank raised money online, where savers chase rates and leave quickly, so it pays more. WaFd's roughly 210 branches hold cheaper, stickier money[6][7]. Whatever either side says about strategy, this spread is the structural reason the deal exists.
- Private equity needs an exit
- The consortium bought TIAA Bank in August 2023[14]. Fund structures have finite lives. A reverse merger into an existing listed company delivers public stock without an IPO's cost and market-timing risk — a faster, more certain route to eventual liquidity[1].
- An open regulatory window
- In 2025 the OCC and FDIC rescinded the Biden-era merger policy statements and restored the older frameworks; the OCC, FDIC and Fed have all publicly pushed for faster decisions[11][12]. Law firms describe 2026 as a period of unusual approval certainty for regional deals[11]. Boards act while windows are open, because they close.
- Subscale banks get squeezed
- Technology and compliance costs are largely fixed. Spreading them across $75 billion in assets rather than $28 billion changes the math[6]. This pressure pushes mid-sized banks to merge regardless of who runs the regulators.
Material realityTwo banks with complementary flaws are combining. EverBank is roughly $46.7 billion in assets with 43 branches and expensive online deposits; WaFd is smaller, with about 210 offices across nine western states and a balance sheet still shaped by its savings-and-loan past[6][7]. The combined bank would hold about $75 billion in assets, $58 billion in loans and $59 billion in deposits, with more than 82% of deposits FDIC-insured — a high figure, meaning most depositors are under the $250,000 guarantee and so less likely to run in a panic[6]. That detail is the direct lesson of the 2023 regional-bank failures. The projected $135 million of annual cost savings has to come from somewhere: overlapping back-office functions, technology contracts, and, historically in bank mergers, branches[10]. Neither company has published a branch-closing or headcount plan. Nothing changes for a customer until the deal closes in early 2027, and it cannot close without regulatory sign-off and a WaFd shareholder vote[1][6].
Narrative as a weaponThree parties are shaping how this reads. The companies control the primary documents and have chosen the metrics — 29% EPS accretion, sub-two-year earn-back, 15% return on tangible common equity — that make the deal look self-evidently sound; they want you to believe this is two weaknesses cancelling out[1][10]. Sell-side analysts amplify that frame because deal flow is their business, and the Piper Sandler quote traveled through most coverage almost verbatim[6]. Against that, the market's own reaction — WaFd down 5.3% — is the one number the companies did not pick, and outlets that lead with it want you to see a minority shareholder handing control to private equity[13]. A fourth voice is currently missing rather than opposed: the community-reinvestment coalitions that formally fought WaFd's 2023 Luther Burbank deal at the FDIC have not yet been reported weighing in here[8][9]. Read the absence carefully. It may mean no objection, or it may mean the objection has not been filed yet.
How Each Side Sees It
Each major actor’s view — how it frames things, its underlying incentive, and how it’s materially affected. Tap a side to read it.
Frames it asTheir case is about funding cost, and it needs one term explained. Banks make money on the gap between what they pay depositors and what they earn on loans. EverBank grew mostly online, with only 43 branches[6]. Online banks win deposits by paying higher rates, and that money is "hot" — savers move it the moment a competitor posts a better rate. Branch deposits are cheaper and stickier: people leave money in a checking account near their house. So the argument is not empire-building. It is that buying 210 branches converts an expensive, flighty funding base into a cheap, stable one — the single biggest lever on a bank's earnings[6][7]. They also argue that at about $75 billion in assets, the combined bank can spread technology and compliance costs over a far larger base, which is how they get to about 15% return on tangible common equity[6][10].
WhyThe consortium bought TIAA Bank in August 2023 and has held it privately since[14]. Private-equity funds need an exit. A reverse merger into an already-listed company is a fast, tax-free path to a public stock they can eventually sell, without the cost and timing risk of an IPO[1][14].
Impact on themThey convert an illiquid private holding into about 59.2% of a Nasdaq-listed bank, keep the EverBank brand and CEO, and keep the bank charter in Jacksonville[1][7]. Their stake's value now rides on whether the promised cost savings actually arrive.
Frames it asWaFd's argument is that standing still was the riskier choice. It is a former thrift — a savings-and-loan built around home mortgages — and it has been trying for years to become a commercial bank that lends to businesses. That transition is slow and expensive to build alone. The board's case is that the deal buys it instantly, and pays for itself fast: about 29% more earnings per share in 2027, with the hit to tangible book value earned back in under two years[1][10]. Tangible book value is roughly what shareholders would have if the bank sold everything and paid its debts, minus goodwill. Deals usually dent it. An earn-back under two years is the industry's rough test for "the math works."
WhyScale and a way out of a subscale position. WaFd was the smaller party in an industry where regulators, in 2026, are approving deals more readily than they did under the prior administration[11][12]. Boards that want to combine have a narrower window than they may later get.
Impact on themWaFd holders keep about 40.8% of a larger bank but give up majority control, the name, and the CEO seat. The market's first verdict was negative: the stock fell 5.3%[13]. The holding company stays in Bellevue; the bank charter and bank headquarters move to Jacksonville[7].
Frames it asThis group is genuinely split, and both halves have real evidence. The favorable case, put by a Piper Sandler analyst, is that this is "a logical combination" letting both banks generate more competitive returns together than either could alone[6]. The skeptical case is not that the strategy is wrong but that the price is. In a reverse merger the public shareholders are diluted to a minority and lose control of strategy and management, which is why such deals often trigger selling[13]. The projected 29% accretion is a management forecast, not a result; it depends on capturing $135 million of cost savings that no one has yet itemized[1][10].
WhyThey must vote on the deal. Their leverage is the required WaFd shareholder approval, which is the only formal choke point besides regulators[1].
Impact on themA 5.3% one-day decline to $34.36 is the immediate mark-to-market[13]. Longer term, they hold a minority stake alongside a coordinated private-equity bloc.
Frames it asNo public campaign against this specific deal has been reported yet, so their position is inferred from the record of WaFd's last acquisition — and it is a serious record. In 2023, 54 national and local nonprofits, coordinated by the California Reinvestment Coalition, formally asked the FDIC to reject WaFd's purchase of Luther Burbank Savings[8][9]. Their argument was not abstract. They cited racial and ethnic disparities in Luther Burbank's mortgage lending, lending to landlords accused of displacing and harassing tenants, WaFd's oil-and-gas lending, and two CFPB penalties against WaFd totaling $234,000 over mortgage-data errors the agency said could hamper discrimination enforcement[8][9]. The CFPB terminated both of those consent orders early, in September 2025, citing WaFd's completed remediation plan and improved compliance controls — a resolution that predates this merger announcement. Their broader principle is that bank mergers routinely close branches in exactly the neighborhoods that can least absorb the loss, and that a merger of a branchless online bank with a 210-branch network gives the acquirer an obvious place to cut.
WhyMerger applications are one of the few moments regulators must formally weigh a bank's record with lower-income communities. Groups use that window to extract branch-retention and lending commitments.
Impact on themTheir leverage is weaker in 2026 than in 2023. The OCC and FDIC rescinded the Biden-era merger policy statements in 2025 and reinstated the older frameworks, and regulators have publicly committed to faster decisions[11][12]. The Luther Burbank deal was approved over their objection anyway[8].
Frames it asRegulators say the goal is timely, predictable decisions, not looser ones. Comptroller Jonathan Gould, Acting FDIC Chairman Travis Hill, and Fed Vice Chair for Supervision Michelle Bowman have all pressed for faster merger processing and for tailoring the application process to community and regional banks[11][12]. The argument for speed is that open-ended reviews themselves discourage healthy combinations and leave weak banks weak. Critics of that view, including in American Banker's opinion pages, argue a deadline-driven process cannot substitute for a real look at competition and community effects[15].
WhyInstitutional. Regulators want a stable, well-capitalized banking system and, in this administration, want to demonstrate that approvals are not indefinite.
Impact on themA $75 billion-asset bank sits well below the thresholds that trigger the toughest large-bank rules, so approval is widely expected — but it is not automatic, and it has not happened yet[6][11].
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The Bias Ledger average rating 3.1
The same story, as framed by outlets across the spectrum, ordered least to most biased. The bias score (1 = straight, 10 = heavily spun) is an AI assessment of that framing — click an outlet to see its track record. The tell is the word choice or omission that reveals the angle.
| Outlet | Vantage | Bias | How they frame it | The tell |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reuters | U.K.-based international wire, U.S. center | 1 | "EverBank to combine with WaFd in $3.9 billion reverse merger" — leads with EverBank as the actor, then lists deal terms. | Uses the neutral verb "combine" and puts EverBank first, which correctly signals who ends up in control. Terms-first, minimal adjectives; no mention of branch or job effects. |
| American Banker | U.S. banking-industry trade press | 2 | "EverBank, WaFd say merger would address each firm's issues" — attributes the rationale to the companies rather than asserting it. | The most explicit about both banks' weaknesses — EverBank's high-cost online deposits, WaFd's unfinished shift from thrift to commercial bank. But it quotes a Piper Sandler analyst approvingly and frames the deal through a management-and-investor lens; depositors and branch communities are largely absent. |
| Banking Dive | U.S. trade press | 2 | "EverBank, WaFd to merge in $3.9B deal" — plain transaction framing. | Straight deal coverage. Notable that the same outlet ran "54 nonprofits oppose WaFd, Luther Burbank merger" in 2023 but does not foreground that history here — an omission by news cycle rather than by slant. |
| Jacksonville Today | U.S. local nonprofit newsroom, Jacksonville | 3 | "EverBank merging with Seattle-based financial institution" — EverBank as subject; WaFd is the unnamed "Seattle-based financial institution." | Mirror image of the Seattle framing. Emphasizes that the bank charter and bank headquarters stay in Jacksonville; gives less weight to the public holding company remaining in Bellevue. A civic-stake selection, not an ideological one. |
| MyNorthwest | U.S. local, Seattle-area commercial radio | 4 | "WaFd entering $3.9 billion merger with Florida-based EverBank, creating $75 billion banking giant" — casts WaFd as the one "entering" the deal. | "Banking giant" is a characterization the companies do not use, and "WaFd entering" softens that WaFd's shareholders end up the minority. Regional framing keeps the Washington company in the subject position. |
| Hoodline | U.S. local-news aggregator, AI-assisted | 5 | "Jacksonville's EverBank to absorb Seattle's WaFd in $3.9 billion bank merger" — "absorb" is the strongest verb any outlet used. | "Absorb" is directionally accurate about control but is a loaded word for an all-stock combination in which WaFd is the surviving legal entity and its CEO becomes president. City-versus-city framing added on top. |
| AlphaStreet | U.S. markets/retail-investor site | 5 | "WaFd Shares Dropping 5.3% on WaFd and EverBank Financial agree on $3.9bn reverse merger" — leads with the price move. | Frames the deal purely through one day of stock movement and adds unattributed causal analysis about dilution and "uncertainty about management control." Plausible, but presented as fact rather than as an interpretation. |
References
- WaFd, Inc. Enters into a $3.9 Billion Reverse Merger Transaction with EverBank Financial Corp — WaFd, Inc. · Primary source — the acquiring/surviving company's own press release; promotional by design
- WaFd entering $3.9 billion merger with Florida-based EverBank, creating $75 billion banking giant — MyNorthwest · U.S. local commercial radio news site (Bonneville International), Seattle market
- WAFD INC — Form 8-K, FY2026 (merger announcement exhibit) — U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (EDGAR) · Primary source — mandatory federal securities filing
- EverBank, WaFd Strike $3.9 Billion Deal to Combine Lenders — Bloomberg Law · U.S. business/legal wire, subscription trade press
- EverBank to combine with WaFd in $3.9 billion reverse merger — CNBC · U.S. business network owned by NBCUniversal/Comcast; markets-investor orientation
- EverBank, WaFd say merger would address each firm's issues — American Banker · U.S. banking-industry trade publication (Arizent); audience is bank executives and investors
- EverBank merging with Seattle-based financial institution — Jacksonville Today · U.S. local nonprofit newsroom (WJCT Public Media), Jacksonville, Florida
- Dozens of community groups oppose WaFd–Luther Burbank deal — American Banker · U.S. banking-industry trade publication (Arizent)
- CRC and Over 50 Organizations Submit Letter Opposing Luther Burbank Savings–Washington Federal Bank Merger — Rise Economy (formerly California Reinvestment Coalition) · U.S. progressive community-reinvestment advocacy coalition; foundation- and member-funded, explicitly opposes most large bank mergers
- WaFd Enters $3.9B Reverse Merger Transaction with EverBank Financial — ABF Journal · U.S. commercial-finance trade publication; industry-facing
- The Long-Anticipated Wave of Bank Consolidation Starts to Break (2026 Insights) — Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP · Corporate law firm client memo; advises acquirers, so structurally favorable to deal-making
- U.S. Bank M&A Outlook for 2026 and Beyond — Reed Smith LLP · Corporate law firm client memo; transactional practice, deal-friendly vantage
- WaFd Shares Dropping 5.3% on WaFd and EverBank Financial agree on $3.9bn reverse merger — AlphaStreet · U.S. retail-investor markets site; short-form, price-action focused
- TIAA Completes Sale of TIAA Bank to Private Investors; Bank Now Doing Business as EverBank — TIAA · Primary source — seller's own 2023 announcement of the private-equity purchase
- No, a 'shot clock' won't improve the bank merger approval process — American Banker (Opinion) · Signed opinion in a U.S. banking trade publication; argues against deadline-driven merger review