Houthi Missile and Drone Attacks on Yemen's al-Makha Port Kill at Least 18 Over Two Days; Saudi Official Says Coordinated Strikes Are Expected
Yemen's internationally recognized government reported 11 dead on August 9 and seven more on August 10 in strikes on the Red Sea port, as a senior Saudi official said Riyadh expects joint attacks by Houthi and Iraqi armed groups.
The Same Attack, Two Names
On the night of August 9, Houthi missiles and drones slammed into al-Makha, the Red Sea port Yemenis also call Mokha. Yemen's internationally recognized government said 11 people died. The next night, more missiles hit the same city. Seven more died[1][6][17]. At least 18 people were dead in two days, soldiers and civilians both, with more than 60 wounded[1][6].
Ask who was hit and you get two different answers, and both come from real reporting. RT's headline called it a barrage on "Saudi-backed troops"[7]. Al Arabiya and Al Jazeera reported it as a strike on a port city that killed civilians[1][6]. The Houthis' own military spokesman, Yahya Saree, said the targets were Saudi-backed forces, equipment and warehouses at Mokha[7]. All of it is true at once: a military target sits inside a city, and a strike on one becomes a strike on the other.
More missiles hit al-Makha and the city of Marib on August 11[2]. A day later, six more people died when a ship was attacked in the nearby strait[14]. The fighting did not pause to let anyone sort out the framing.
A Blockade Answered With a Warning
The al-Makha strikes did not happen in isolation. On July 20, the Houthis declared a naval blockade on shipping tied to Saudi Arabia and have since claimed attacks on Saudi-linked tankers[10][11]. On August 9, they said they hit Saudi Aramco's Jazan refinery with a drone. Saudi Arabia's Energy Ministry confirmed a fire there, said no one was hurt, and gave no cause[8][9].
Three days before that, on August 6, a senior Saudi official told CNN that Riyadh expects coordinated attacks on its ports and airports. The official said Saudi intelligence had tracked meetings between Iraqi armed groups, Houthi figures and officers from Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps[4][5]. That is one anonymous source describing intelligence the public cannot check. It is also the reason a port strike in Yemen is being read in Washington and Riyadh as the opening move of something bigger.
Here is the tension nobody resolves: the Houthis say they are answering a siege with a siege. Saudi Arabia has restricted sea and air access to northern Yemen for years, and Saudi and U.S. aircraft have struck Yemeni territory, including recent strikes over Saada and Hajjah[8]. From that vantage, hitting Saudi oil and ports is retaliation, not aggression, in a war Riyadh chose to join[11]. Saudi Arabia and Yemen's government see the same events as the opposite: an unprovoked economic war, aimed at ports, airports and energy sites rather than at soldiers[4]. Both readings explain the same missiles. Neither side has to be lying for that to be true.
Why a Poor Militia Can Move the Price of Oil
To understand why al-Makha keeps getting hit, it helps to look at a map. The Bab al-Mandeb strait is about 18 miles wide at its narrowest point, and nearly all shipping between Europe and Asia through the Suez Canal has to pass through it[11][16]. The Houthis control the Yemeni shore of that strait. That single fact of geography lets a movement with no navy and no real economy set the price of oil for everyone else[11][16].
There's a second piece of geography that raises the stakes even higher this year. Because of the wider war with Iran, Gulf oil has already been rerouted away from the Strait of Hormuz, the other choke point near Iran. Saudi Arabia now pipes crude across the country to the Red Sea port of Yanbu instead[16]. That workaround only functions if the Red Sea stays safe. Attacking Red Sea ports closes the back door right after the front door was already narrowed, which is exactly why Saudi Arabia's Red Sea infrastructure has become such a prime target.
The price signal is already visible. Brent crude, the global oil benchmark, traded near $89.63 a barrel on August 12, 2026, after briefly topping $100 in late July[12][20]. That is well below the July spike, but still far above what it cost before this war began. And the practical gatekeeper on the whole route is something most readers never think about: war-risk insurance, the extra premium shipping insurers charge to cover a vessel entering a combat zone[16]. When that premium rises, carriers start sailing around Africa instead, adding weeks to a voyage and millions of dollars per trip, even if not a single ship gets hit[16]. That cost eventually shows up in the price of goods on a shelf somewhere far from Yemen.
Riyadh's Bind
Saudi Arabia has spent roughly a decade trying to extract itself from the Yemen war, and it cannot easily walk back in. A ground campaign against the Houthis would be expensive and deeply unpopular at home. Doing nothing invites more strikes on its refineries and ports[4][13]. That bind, not just rhetoric, is why Riyadh is releasing intelligence through anonymous officials and warning allies, rather than announcing an offensive of its own[4][13].
A parallel version of the same bind is playing out in Iraq. Iraqi armed groups say they are retaliating for U.S. and Saudi strikes on their own positions inside Iraq[15]. But on August 7, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq announced it was postponing its planned response, after mediation from a senior Iraqi political figure[15]. Iraq's government does not want to become a battlefield between Washington, Riyadh and Tehran, and that postponement suggests the militias are weighing that domestic cost themselves, not simply taking orders from Iran[15].
The United States, for its part, says its role is protecting freedom of navigation and its own forces, not fighting Yemen's civil war outright, and its stated policy since March 2025 has been to degrade Houthi capability to threaten shipping[18]. Some members of Congress have invoked the War Powers Resolution over Yemen, arguing that repeated strikes haven't stopped the attacks and are pulling the U.S. deeper into a war it never formally authorized[18].
Who Gets to Decide Whether Anyone Is Neutral
Sitting apart from all of these accounts is the United Nations. On August 7, Special Envoy Hans Grundberg said Yemen faces a greater risk of full-scale war than at any point since the truce brokered in April 2022[3]. He did not blame one side. He called on all parties to show restraint and said civilians and civilian infrastructure need protection no matter what military justification is attached to a target[3].
That posture of "restraint by all parties" is itself a kind of position, and both Riyadh and the Houthis have criticized it as false balance, each arguing their side is the one actually under attack[3]. For the roughly 18 people buried in al-Makha this week, and for the millions of Yemenis who depend on imported food and fuel coming through that port, the argument over blame changes nothing about the damage to the docks, warehouses and power equipment already done[3][17][19].
What happens next likely turns on the same question Grundberg's office won't answer: whether Iran is directing this escalation, or whether the Houthis and Iraqi militias are pursuing their own separate fights that happen to look coordinated from the outside[4][5]. Saudi Arabia is watching for the next strike on its own soil. Iraq's government is trying to hold its own militias back. And in Amman, the UN envoy is left repeating a warning that, so far, keeps getting overtaken by events on the ground[2][14][15].
Summary
Houthi forces hit the Red Sea port city of al-Makha, also written Mokha, with missiles and drones on August 9 and August 10, 2026. The port is held by Yemen's internationally recognized government. That government's army said 11 people died on August 9 and seven more on August 10, for at least 18 dead across the two days[1][6][17]. It said the dead included both soldiers and civilians, and that more than 60 people were wounded in total. The Houthis, who call themselves Ansar Allah, said they were striking Saudi-backed troops, equipment and warehouses[7]. Further missile attacks on al-Makha and on Marib followed on August 11[2].
The strikes come inside a much larger war. Since July 20 the Houthis have declared a naval blockade on shipping tied to Saudi Arabia and have claimed attacks on Saudi-linked tankers[10][11]. On August 9 they claimed a drone strike on Saudi Aramco's Jazan refinery; Saudi Arabia's Energy Ministry confirmed a fire there, said no one was hurt, and did not give a cause[8][9]. On August 6, a senior Saudi official told CNN the kingdom expects coordinated attacks on its ports and airports by Iraqi armed groups working with the Houthis, and said Saudi intelligence had tracked meetings involving Iraqis, Houthis and members of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps[4][5].
The core dispute is about who is escalating and why. Saudi Arabia, the Yemeni government and U.S. hawks say Iran is directing a two-front campaign against civilian and economic targets[4][5][13]. The Houthis say they are answering a Saudi-led blockade of Yemen and U.S. and Saudi strikes on Yemen and Iraq, and that Saudi oil and ports are legitimate targets in a war Riyadh joined[6][11]. UN envoy Hans Grundberg has not endorsed either account; on August 7 he said Yemen faces its greatest risk of full-scale war since the 2022 truce and told all parties to show maximum restraint[3].
For American readers the stake is the price of fuel and goods. Brent crude, the global oil benchmark, traded near $89.63 a barrel on August 12, after briefly topping $100 in July[12][20]. The Bab al-Mandeb strait beside al-Makha is one of the world's main shipping chokepoints, and it has become more important during this war because it is the way Gulf oil can reach buyers without passing through the Strait of Hormuz[16].
The Event
On August 9 and 10, 2026, Houthi forces fired ballistic missiles and launched drones at the port city of al-Makha on Yemen's Red Sea coast, an area held by the internationally recognized Yemeni government[1][17]. The Yemeni army said 11 people were killed on August 9 and seven on August 10, and that the dead included soldiers and civilians; it reported roughly 30 wounded in each wave[1][6]. Port docks, warehouses, homes and power-generating equipment were damaged, according to the Yemeni government and the UN envoy's office[3][19]. Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree said the operation targeted Saudi-backed forces, equipment and warehouses at Mokha[7].
Undisputed Facts
- Al-Makha (Mokha) sits on Yemen's Red Sea coast near the Bab al-Mandeb strait and is controlled by forces aligned with Yemen's internationally recognized government[1].
- Yemen's government army publicly reported at least 18 people killed in the August 9 and August 10 strikes, including both military personnel and civilians[1][6][17].
- Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree publicly claimed the attacks and described the targets as Saudi-backed forces and military stores[7].
- UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg issued a statement from Amman on August 7, 2026 saying Yemen faces a greater risk of renewed large-scale conflict than at any time since the April 2022 UN-brokered truce[3].
- On July 20, 2026 the Houthis publicly declared a naval blockade on shipping linked to Saudi Arabia and have since claimed attacks on Saudi-linked vessels[10][11].
- Saudi Arabia's Energy Ministry confirmed a fire at an Aramco facility at Jazan on August 9, 2026, said there were no casualties, and did not state the cause; the Houthis claimed a drone strike[8][9].
- A senior Saudi official told CNN on August 6, 2026 that Riyadh expects coordinated attacks on Saudi ports, airports and energy sites by Iraqi armed groups and the Houthis[4].
- Brent crude traded near $89.63 a barrel on August 12, 2026, after rising above $100 in late July[12][20].
The Pressure
Strip away the moralizing and blame. What structural realities persist regardless of which narrative wins?
- Geography as leverage
- The Bab al-Mandeb is a strait about 18 miles wide at its narrowest, between Yemen and Djibouti. Nearly all Europe-to-Asia shipping through the Suez Canal passes it. The Houthis sit on the Yemeni shore. That single fact gives a movement with no navy and no economy the power to move world oil prices, and it is why they escalate at sea rather than only on land[11][16].
- The Hormuz bypass
- Because of the war with Iran, Gulf oil has been rerouted away from the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi Arabia pipes crude across the country to the Red Sea port of Yanbu instead. That workaround only functions if the Red Sea is safe. Attacking it closes the back door after the front door was already narrowed — which is exactly why Saudi Red Sea infrastructure has become the target of choice[16].
- Riyadh's exit problem
- Saudi Arabia has spent years trying to leave the Yemen war and cannot easily re-enter it. A ground campaign is expensive and unpopular; doing nothing invites more strikes. This constraint, not rhetoric, explains why Riyadh is publicizing intelligence and seeking outside protection rather than announcing an offensive[4][13].
- Attribution is a weapon
- Whether the Houthis act on Iranian orders or their own account is not just an analytical question — it determines who can lawfully be retaliated against. Both sides know this. Saudi Arabia and its allies gain from an Iranian command chain; Iran and the Houthis gain from Houthi independence. Treat both claims as interested[4][5].
Material realityAl-Makha's docks, warehouses and power equipment are damaged, and the city has buried at least 18 people from two days of strikes according to Yemen's government[1][6][17]. Missiles continued to land on al-Makha and Marib on August 11, and a ship was attacked in the Bab al-Mandeb on August 12 with six reported dead[2][14]. A fire burned at Aramco's Jazan refinery on August 9 and was put out with no casualties, cause not stated by Saudi authorities[8]. Brent crude sat near $89.63 a barrel on August 12, off the July peak above $100 but well above pre-war levels[12][20]. War-risk insurance — the extra premium underwriters charge to cover a ship entering a combat zone — is now the practical gatekeeper on the route: when it rises, carriers reroute around Africa even if no ship is hit, and the added weeks and fuel show up in consumer prices[16]. None of that depends on which narrative wins.
Narrative as a weaponFour actors are working hard on your perception. Saudi Arabia is releasing intelligence through anonymous officials, which lets it warn the world and build a case against Iran without signing its name to specifics that may not hold up; it wants you to see a two-front Iranian assault on civilian economic targets[4][5]. The Houthis, through Yahya Saree's statements, want you to see reciprocity — a blockade answered with a blockade, air raids answered with missiles — and to see al-Makha as a barracks rather than a port[7][11]. Russian and some regional state media want you to see U.S. and Saudi power failing to protect anyone, so casualties are recast as combatants[7]. Hawkish U.S. and Israeli outlets want you to see one Iranian hand behind three fronts, which makes striking Iran itself the logical answer[13]. The UN envoy is the one prominent voice not assigning blame, and his office's language — restraint by 'all parties' — is itself a position, one that both Riyadh and the Houthis have criticized as false equivalence[3].
How Each Side Sees It
Each major actor’s view — how it frames things, its underlying incentive, and how it’s materially affected. Tap a side to read it.
Frames it asThe Houthis say this is defense, not aggression. Their case: Saudi Arabia has restricted sea and air access to northern Yemen for years, and Saudi and U.S. aircraft have struck Yemeni territory, including over Saada and Hajjah[8]. So they answer a siege with a siege — 'an eye for an eye' — and treat Saudi ports, refineries and shipping as fair targets in a war Riyadh chose to join[11]. On al-Makha specifically, they argue the port is not a civilian site but a staging ground: government forces were massing there, and Saree named troops, equipment and warehouses as the targets[7]. Iran's own framing is that it neither commands nor controls these groups, and that Gulf states invited the risk by hosting U.S. forces and backing strikes on Iran.
WhySurvival and recognition. Blockading Saudi oil gives a poor movement leverage over a rich state and over global markets, which is the one thing that forces outside powers to negotiate with it[11][16]. Holding the fight going also keeps internal rivals and the Marib and Red Sea fronts under pressure[2].
Impact on themThe movement absorbs U.S., Israeli and Saudi strikes on its territory and leadership, and rules an area where most people depend on imported food and fuel[18]. Every escalation raises the odds of a ground offensive by government forces staging from exactly the ports it is hitting[3].
Frames it asRiyadh's strongest argument is that it is being attacked at home. It points to a confirmed refinery fire at Jazan, claimed attacks on eight Saudi-linked ships since the blockade was declared, and intelligence it says shows IRGC officers meeting Iraqi militia and Houthi figures while drones and missiles moved into position[4][5][13]. On that reading the target set is civilian and economic — ports, airports, energy — which is a war on an economy, not a battlefield[4]. The Yemeni government adds that al-Makha's dead included civilians and that the port is a lifeline for imports into a country in a food crisis, so striking it hurts Yemenis first[1][6].
WhyRiyadh has spent a decade trying to exit the Yemen war and pivot to its economic diversification plans. It wants deterrence and outside protection without a new ground campaign it cannot cheaply win[13].
Impact on themSaudi Arabia's Red Sea coast holds refineries and the Yanbu terminal that let its oil bypass the Strait of Hormuz — the workaround that made the Red Sea route more valuable in this war[16]. Sustained strikes there raise insurance costs, deter tanker crews and threaten the export revenue the whole Saudi budget runs on[12][16].
Frames it asWashington's stated position is that it is protecting freedom of navigation and U.S. forces, not fighting Yemen's civil war; U.S. policy since March 2025 has been to degrade Houthi capability to threaten shipping[18]. Hawks argue that anything short of destroying launch and resupply networks simply invites more attacks, and that Iranian resupply flights into Sanaa show the pipeline is still open[13][18]. Critics inside U.S. politics, including members of Congress who have invoked the War Powers Resolution over Yemen, argue the opposite: strikes have not stopped the attacks, and each round pulls the U.S. further into a war Congress never authorized[18].
WhyKeep oil flowing and keep American casualties low in an election-cycle economy, while avoiding an open-ended ground commitment[12][18].
Impact on themHigher crude prices feed into U.S. pump prices and freight costs[12][20]. U.S. naval and air assets are tied down in the Red Sea, and U.S. and Saudi strikes inside Iraq have already drawn threatened retaliation from Iraqi militias[15].
Frames it asThese groups say they are responding to U.S. and Saudi strikes on their positions inside Iraq, and that hitting the states that host or enable those strikes is legitimate retaliation, not unprovoked aggression[15]. Iraq's government, for its part, argues it should not be treated as a launchpad and is trying to hold the militias back — on August 7 the Islamic Resistance in Iraq announced it was postponing its response after mediation by Badr Organization leader Hadi al-Ameri[15].
WhyThe militias want to punish the U.S. presence without triggering a war that destroys their political standing inside Iraq. Baghdad wants to avoid becoming a battlefield between Washington, Riyadh and Tehran[15].
Impact on themIf the northern front opens, Iraq risks losing its own oil exports and its relationship with Gulf neighbors. The postponement announcement is itself evidence that these groups weigh Iraqi domestic cost, not only Iranian direction[15].
Frames it asAid agencies and the UN envoy argue that the argument over who started it is beside the point for people under the missiles. Grundberg's position is that civilians and civilian infrastructure must be protected regardless of the military claim attached to a target, and that the gains of the 2022 truce are eroding[3]. Shipowners argue they are neutral commercial traffic being used as leverage by both sides.
WhyAid groups want access and a ceasefire. Carriers want predictable, insurable routes[16].
Impact on themDamage to al-Makha's docks hits an import channel for a country that buys most of its food abroad[3][17]. For carriers, avoiding the Red Sea means sailing around Africa; one shipping trade analysis put the detour at thousands of extra nautical miles and weeks of added transit, with added freight costs running into the millions of dollars per voyage before fuel and insurance[16]. That cost lands eventually on the price of goods.
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The Bias Ledger average rating 5.4
The same story, as framed by outlets across the spectrum, ordered least to most biased. The bias score (1 = straight, 10 = heavily spun) is an AI assessment of that framing — click an outlet to see its track record. The tell is the word choice or omission that reveals the angle.
| Outlet | Vantage | Bias | How they frame it | The tell |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Al Jazeera | Qatari state-funded | 4 | "New Houthi missile and drone attacks kill seven in Yemen's al-Makha" — casualty-first, with the Houthi rationale and the UN envoy's warning both quoted[1]. | Files the story under a 'US-Israel war on Iran' tag, which frames Yemen as a front in a war the West started. Gives unusual space to the 'siege for a siege' rationale — accurate as reporting of a claim, but it sets the Houthi grievance as the story's baseline. |
| France 24 | French state-funded, center | 4 | "Iran-backed Houthis strike Red Sea port of Mocha, threatening shipping routes" — the shipping consequence is in the headline[19]. | The standing modifier 'Iran-backed' appears before the actor in nearly every reference, which quietly settles the agency question the article never actually tests. |
| CNN | U.S. center-left | 5 | "Saudi Arabia braces for attacks on ports and airports by Iraqi militias working with Iran-backed Houthis" — an anticipated attack, told through an anonymous Saudi official[4]. | The load-bearing sourcing is one senior Saudi official, and the headline states the coordination as fact rather than as that official's claim. Saudi and U.S. strikes inside Yemen and Iraq appear far below the fold, so the escalation reads as one-directional. |
| The Jerusalem Post | Israeli right-of-center | 5 | "Saudi Arabia expects coordinated attacks by Houthis, Iraqi militias, official says" — the IRGC supervision claim is central[5]. | Emphasizes the Iranian command chain and the word 'supervision'. The attribution is kept in the headline, which is more careful than some U.S. versions, but the article treats Iranian direction as the organizing fact of the story. |
| Al Arabiya | Saudi state-linked (MBC Group, Riyadh) | 5 | "Yemen says Houthi attack on Mokha kills seven, wounds 30, UN envoy expresses concern" — Yemeni government figures plus UN condemnation[6]. | Sourcing is properly attributed to the Yemeni military, but the Houthi justification and Saudi actions inside Yemen are minimized. The pairing of casualty count with UN concern builds an international-legitimacy frame for Riyadh's side. |
| FDD's Long War Journal | U.S. right, hawkish (Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a pro-Israel advocacy organization) | 7 | "Houthis escalate attacks in Red Sea and on Saudi Arabia, Riyadh evaluates options" — an escalation ledger with a running count of struck vessels[13]. | Uses 'terror group' as a descriptor and tracks Houthi actions in detail while treating Saudi and U.S. strikes as responses. Strong on specifics; the omission is any accounting of what the other side counts as provocation. |
| RT | Russian state | 8 | "Yemen's Houthis unleash missile barrage on Saudi-backed troops" — the target is described as troops, not a port city[7]. | Civilian deaths are demoted below the military framing, and 'Saudi-backed' does the work of making the target foreign. Reframes an attack on a populated port as a clean battlefield exchange, which serves a broader interest in showing U.S. allies failing to protect their clients. |
References
- New Houthi missile and drone attacks kill seven in Yemen's al-Makha — Al Jazeera · Qatari state-funded
- Yemen's Houthis launch ballistic missile attacks on al-Makha and Marib — Al Jazeera · Qatari state-funded
- Statement attributable to the UN Special Envoy for Yemen – Hans Grundberg on the situation in Yemen — United Nations Office of the Special Envoy for Yemen · UN body; mandate depends on consent of the warring parties
- Saudi Arabia braces for attacks on ports and airports by Iraqi militias working with Iran-backed Houthis — CNN · U.S. center-left
- Saudi Arabia expects coordinated attacks by Houthis, Iraqi militias, official says — The Jerusalem Post · Israeli right-of-center
- Yemen says Houthi attack on Mokha kills seven, wounds 30, UN envoy expresses concern — Al Arabiya · Saudi state-linked, owned by Riyadh-based MBC Group
- Yemen's Houthis unleash missile barrage on Saudi-backed troops (VIDEOS) — RT · Russian state-funded
- Houthi attacks kill seven in Yemen, refinery targeted in Saudi Arabia — Al Jazeera · Qatari state-funded
- Iran denies any direct talks with U.S. on opening Strait of Hormuz as Houthis claim attack on Saudi refinery — CNBC · U.S. business press, market-focused
- Yemen's Houthis declare naval blockade on Saudi Arabia, widening threat to global oil supplies — NBC News · U.S. center-left
- Yemen's Houthis declare naval blockade of Saudi Arabia: What to know — Al Jazeera · Qatari state-funded
- Oil prices leap after Houthi attacks in Red Sea — The Washington Post · U.S. center-left
- Houthis escalate attacks in Red Sea and on Saudi Arabia, Riyadh evaluates options — FDD's Long War Journal · U.S. right, hawkish; project of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a pro-Israel advocacy organization
- Six killed in Houthi attack on Bab al-Mandeb ship, Yemen's government says — Al Jazeera · Qatari state-funded
- Iran Update Evening Special Report: August 07, 2026 — Critical Threats Project · U.S. right-of-center; joint project of the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War
- As oil soars, experts watch Red Sea tankers for clarity on Houthi blockade — Al Jazeera · Qatari state-funded
- Houthi attacks on Yemen's al-Makha port cause several casualties — SAFETY4SEA · Greek maritime-industry trade publication, shipowner-oriented
- Yemen: Conflict, Red Sea Security, and U.S. Policy — Congressional Research Service · U.S. legislative branch research arm; nonpartisan by statute, written for members of Congress
- Iran-backed Houthis strike Red Sea port of Mocha, threatening shipping routes — France 24 · French state-funded international broadcaster
- Houthi Attacks Escalate in Bab Al-Mandab, Driving Brent Crude to $89.63 — NewsCord · Aggregator that compares framing across outlets; not an original reporting source